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	<title>CIPP Guide &#187; Encryption</title>
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	<description>Your Guide to the CIPP</description>
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		<title>OMB Memorandum 07-16 Safeguarding Against and Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information</title>
		<link>http://www.cippguide.org/2010/05/04/omb-memorandum-07-16-safeguarding-against-and-responding-to-the-breach-of-personally-identifiable-information/</link>
		<comments>http://www.cippguide.org/2010/05/04/omb-memorandum-07-16-safeguarding-against-and-responding-to-the-breach-of-personally-identifiable-information/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 May 2010 12:00:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>jbrook</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[CIPP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Compliance & Regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[breach notification]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CERT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CIPP/G]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data breach]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive Order 13402]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Federal Inforamtion Security Management Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FISMA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Identity Theft]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Memorandum 07-16]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NIST SP 800-37]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Personally Identifiable]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PII]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Presidential Identity Theft Task Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy Act of 1974]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Security Number]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SSN]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cippguide.org/?p=1461</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Executive Order 13402 commanded the creation of a Presidential Identity Theft Task Force to examine how the Federal Government could better respond to and protect against data breaches resulting in identity theft. Under Federal regulations, such as the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Federal Information Security Management Act, individuals are guaranteed the security of their data, making adequate protection of data a matter of [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Executive Order 13402 commanded the creation of a Presidential Identity Theft Task Force to examine how the Federal Government could better respond to and protect against data breaches resulting in identity theft. Under Federal regulations, such as the <a href="http://www.cippguide.org/2010/02/10/privacy-act-of-1974/">Privacy Act of 1974</a> and the <a href="http://www.cippguide.org/2010/03/04/fisma-the-federal-information-security-management-act/">Federal Information Security Management Act</a>, individuals are guaranteed the security of their data, making adequate protection of data a matter of compliance.</p>
<p>On May 22, 2007 the Presidential Identity Theft Task Force issued <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/memoranda/fy2007/m07-16.pdf">Memorandum 07-16</a>. It required all agencies to develop and implement data breach notification policies within 120 days, as outlined by the memorandum. M-07-16 included a number of new recommendations and requirements agencies must use in creating such policies.</p>
<p><strong>What is Personally Identifiable Information (PII)?</strong></p>
<p>M-07-16 expanded the definition of personally identifiable information to the following: “personally identifiable information refers to information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as their name, social security number, biometric records, etc. alone, or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as data and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, etc.”</p>
<p>The following are a number of requirements outlined by various attachments to M-07-16 in order to protect personally identifiable information:</p>
<p><strong>Safeguarding Against the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information</strong></p>
<p>Part A of Attachment I reiterated the privacy and security requirements for Federal agencies enforced under the Privacy Act, such as establishing safeguards, ensuring the integrity of data and establishing “rules of conduct” for individuals handling information. Furthermore, under the Privacy Act, agencies are require to assign risk levels to information systems according to <strong><a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-37-rev1/sp800-37-rev1-final.pdf">NIST SP 800-37</a></strong>.</p>
<p>Attachment I also created the following new requirements:</p>
<p><em>Review and Reduce the Volume of Personally Identifiable Information</em></p>
<p>Agencies should conduct an initial review to identify records containing PII and ensure that the information is timely, accurate, relevant and complete. Only the information necessary for carrying out government activities should be maintained. After the initial review, the holdings of PII should be periodically review according to a public schedule</p>
<p><em>Reduce the Use of Social Security Numbers</em></p>
<p>All agencies were required to develop a plan within 120 days of the memorandum to eliminate any unnecessary collection of Social Security Numbers (SSN) within eighteen months. Furthermore agencies were also charged with the responsibility of working with other Federal agencies to create a Federal identifier separate from Social Security Numbers.</p>
<p><em>Security Requirements</em></p>
<p>Agencies must implement the following security features to protect all Federal information, not just data containing PII:</p>
<ul>
<li>Encryption</li>
<li>Require two factor authentication using separate devices when accessing information remotely</li>
<li>Implement a Time-Out function requiring re-authentication after a period of inactivity on remote access and mobile devices</li>
<li>Log data extracts from data files containing sensitive information and verify each extract including the destruction of sensitive data after 90 days after it is no longer in use</li>
<li>Educate all individuals handling PII and have them sign a document annually stating they understand their responsibilities.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Incident Reporting and Handling</strong></p>
<p>Attachment 2 of M-07-16 reviewed FISMA guidelines for the reporting of data breaches and modified several requirements.</p>
<p><strong><em><a href="http://www.us-cert.gov/federal/reportingRequirements.html">US-CERT Reporting</a></em></strong></p>
<p>All agencies must report incidents involving PII to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team regardless of whether a threat may be potential or confirmed. Reporting <em>must</em> take place with one hour of its detection for Category 1 incidents. Examples of Category 1 incidents include:</p>
<ul>
<li>An individual gaining physical or logical access to a Federal agency’s network, information system, applications, or data without authorization</li>
<li>Any confirmed or potential breach of personally identifiable information regardless of how the breach occurred</li>
</ul>
<p><em>Develop and Publish a Routine Use</em></p>
<p>Routine use includes all uses of data which are in line with the purposes for which data was originally collected. Effectively taking countermeasures to reduce the threat to information due to a security breach may require Federal agencies to share PII with other agencies and law enforcement officials with whom no data sharing agreement exists. To respond adequately, agencies should establish routine use policies to allow the disclosure of information without the prior consent of the individual in situations involving data breach investigations.</p>
<p><strong><em><a href="http://www.cippguide.org/2010/04/18/recommendations-for-identity-theft-related-data-breach-notification/">External Breach Notification</a></em></strong></p>
<p>Attachment 3 of M-07-16 addresses how and when data breaches should be reported to   affected individuals and/or the public. All agencies must develop data breach notification policies to guide officials and deciding when notification is necessary and how it should be undertaken.</p>
<p><em>Whether Breach Notification is Required</em></p>
<p>Agencies should assess the level of risk and the likelihood of the breach causing harm using the following five factors:</p>
<ul>
<li>Type of information compromised</li>
<li>Number of affected individuals</li>
<li>Accessibility and usability of the information</li>
<li>Likelihood of harm occurring</li>
<li>Ability of the agency to mitigate harm</li>
</ul>
<p><em>Timelines of the Notification</em></p>
<p>If notification is to be undertaken, it should be carried out promptly upon discovery. Notification may be delayed, as authorized but a senior official, if notification may seriously affect law enforcement proceedings.</p>
<p><em>Source of the Notification</em></p>
<p>Notification to affected individuals should come from the head of the agency where the breach occurred. Notification for breaches affecting less than fifty people may also come from the Chief Information or Privacy Officer.</p>
<p><em>Contents of the Notification</em></p>
<p>Notice should be provide in writing and contain the following information</p>
<ul>
<li>Type of information compromised</li>
<li>Whether the information was encrypted or similarly protected</li>
<li>Steps the individual can take to mitigate harm</li>
<li>Steps the agency is taking to investigate the breach, mitigate harm and protect against future incidents</li>
<li>Contact information for the agency</li>
</ul>
<p><em>Means of Providing Notification</em></p>
<p>Method of notification depends on the number of affected individuals and the urgency of the notification. Methods include:</p>
<ul>
<li>Telephone</li>
<li>First-Class mail</li>
<li>Email</li>
<li>Existing Government wide services</li>
<li>Newspapers and other media</li>
<li>Any accommodations necessary for individuals with disabilities</li>
</ul>
<p><em>Who Receives Notification</em></p>
<p>For every data breach, agencies must consider whether to provide notification to the affected individuals and/or the public. Notification to individuals should occur promptly after the need for notification has been determined. Notification to the public including the media should be carefully planned to avoid alarm or confusion. Notice should also be posted on the agencies web page when public notification occurs. <em></em></p>
<p><strong>Rules and Consequences Policy:</strong></p>
<p>Attachment 4 of M-07-16 set forth a new requirement. All agencies must develop and implement a Rules and Consequences policy for employees handling personally identifiable information.</p>
<p>The policy must outline the requirements of employees according to their level of responsibility and the type of information they handle. Employees must be aware of their responsibilities under Federal law as well as the consequences for any violations. Supervisors that fail to take disciplinary action when violations occur are also subject to penalties. The policy should address:</p>
<ul>
<li>The types of individuals that must comply, including employees, contractors and other individuals handling PII maintained by the Federal government</li>
<li>The types of actions that constitute violations including
<ul>
<li>Failing to maintain or implement security controls</li>
<li>Accessing PII or disclosing PII to other individuals without authorization</li>
<li>Failing to report suspected data breaches or unauthorized disclosures</li>
<li>Failing to adequately instruct, train or supervise employees handling PII (for managers)</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Summary</strong></p>
<p>The Federal Government has a legal responsibility to protect the personally identifiable information is has collected from individuals. Memoranda such as M-07-16 ensure that the security of personally identifiable information remains an ongoing discussion and concern within the Federal Government.</p>
<p><em>CIPP/G Candidate Preparation</em></p>
<p>In preparation for the Certified Information Privacy Professional Government exam, a privacy professional should be comfortable with topics related to this post including:</p>
<ul>
<li>OMB Memorandum 07-16 (II.A.c.2.j)</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Common Risks Impeding the Adequate Protection of Government Information</title>
		<link>http://www.cippguide.org/2010/03/22/common-risks-impeding-the-adequate-protection-of-government-information/</link>
		<comments>http://www.cippguide.org/2010/03/22/common-risks-impeding-the-adequate-protection-of-government-information/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Mar 2010 12:00:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>jbrook</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[CIPP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Compliance & Regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Adequate Protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[audit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CIPP/G]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cloud computing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Common Risks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data destruction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DHS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[E-Government Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Federal Acquisition Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FOIA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Freedom of Information Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NIST]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[OMB]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PIA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Presidential Identity Theft Task Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy Act of 1974]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy Impact Assessments]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Training]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cippguide.org/?p=1405</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In 2007, the Department of Homeland Security an Office of Management and Budget, along with the Presidential Identity Theft Task Force, investigated information privacy and security practices in the United States Government. They developed a report called the Common Risks Impeding the Adequate Protection of Government Information (pdf)which included a list of ten common mistakes made by U.S. departments and agencies and provided recommendations for new practices to be implement to eliminate and reduce security [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 2007, the Department of Homeland Security adn Office of Management and Budget, along with the Presidential Identity Theft Task Force, investigated information privacy and security practices in the United States Government. They developed a report called the<a href="http://www.dns-lessons.lanl.gov/.../Common-Risks-Impeding-Adequate-Protection-Govt-Info1.pdf"> Common Risks Impeding the Adequate Protection of Government Information</a> (pdf)which included a list of ten common mistakes made by U.S. departments and agencies and provided recommendations for new practices to be implement to eliminate and reduce security risks.</p>
<p><strong>1. “Security and Privacy Training is inadequate and poorly aligned with the different roles and responsibilities of personnel.”</strong></p>
<p>Proper security and privacy education is part of the administrative safeguards needed to properly protect data. Information handlers must understand the risks facing sensitive information and their responsibilities towards maintaining the <a href="../2010/01/18/fair-information-practices-principles/">Fair Information Practices Principles</a>. The report instructed agencies to include privacy and security training upon employment, maintain awareness through weekly tips, annual “security days” and other creative reminders. Agencies should also target individuals with more security and privacy responsibilities and provide more extensive training.</p>
<p><strong>2. “Contracts and data sharing agreements between agencies and entities operating on behalf of the agency do not describe the procedures for appropriately processing and adequately safeguarding information.” </strong></p>
<p><a href="../2010/02/10/privacy-act-of-1974/">The Privacy Act of 1974</a> allows the sharing of information between government agencies provided the information receives the same level of protection after disclosure and the two agencies sign and follow a data sharing agreement. Failing to comply with a  data sharing agreement may allow serious breaches of a individual’s privacy. Agencies are encouraged to offer incentives for successful compliance with a data sharing agreement or contract. Agencies are also required to create detailed agreements (<a href="https://www.acquisition.gov/far/draftingguide.htm">using Federal Acquisition Regulation Language</a>) describing the procedures for protecting the information and assigning an individual to oversee the data sharing process.</p>
<p>3. <strong>“Information inventories inaccurately describe the types and uses of government information, and the locations where it is stored, processed or transmitted, including personally identifiable information.”</strong></p>
<p>Under the <a href="../2010/02/08/foia-the-freedom-of-information-act/">Freedom of Information Act</a> and the <a href="../2010/02/10/privacy-act-of-1974/">Privacy Act of 1974</a>, government agencies are required to maintain adequate records on the type or information systems they maintain and the types and uses of the information. With a few exceptions, such information must be available to the public. Improper record keeping poses a threat to the transparency of government activities and an individual’s right to access the information and agency maintains about them. Agencies should use <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/e-gov/fea/">enterprise architecture</a> and inventories to review the type, location, and uses of information it has on record. Security controls should be developed in consideration of the inventory and all systems containing personally identifiable information should be regularly assessed to ensure the integrity and security of the data.</p>
<p><strong>4. “Information is not appropriately scheduled, archived or destroyed.”</strong></p>
<p>Information must be protected at all stages of its lifecycle including those when it is not in active use. The <a href="../2009/11/23/data-destruction-and-privacy/">proper destruction of information</a> is particularly important to safeguarding privacy. Information must be assessed to determine how long it needs to be maintained and whether it is permanent and needs to be archived by the NARA or temporary and needs to be destroyed. Agencies must obtain the National Archives and Records Administration approval to dispose of their records according to established record schedules.</p>
<p><strong>5. </strong><strong>“Suspicious activities and incidents are not identified and reported in a timely manner.”</strong></p>
<p>Information security is an ongoing process which requires identifying and detecting potential threats. Instituting a system without following up with security checks and incident response is ignoring a fundamental part of the information security process. Agencies should develop and follow a set of procedures to identify and respond to security or privacy incidents. Response should be timely in order to be effective. Agencies should configure their computer systems to detect intrusions, monitor use, and log any incidents. Furthermore incidents should be reported to authorized personnel and agencies to reduce risk as quickly as possible.</p>
<p><strong>6. “Audit Trails documenting how information is processed are not appropriately created or reviewed.”</strong></p>
<p>It is not just the type of information that is collected but how it is used that is restricted to protect privacy and civil liberties. Accurate audit trails are necessary to record how information is being collected, used, maintained and disclosed by an agency. Agencies should use managed data repositories to develop and review the necessary audit trails. Those audit trails can then be used to identify anomalies, determine the status of data and destroy data when it is no longer necessary.</p>
<p><strong>7. “Inadequate security controls where information is collected, created, processed or maintained.”</strong></p>
<p>Security controls include technical, physical and administrative safeguards. They are the primary defense against unauthorized access and use of information. Agencies should maintain inventories of their physical property including real estate and mobile devices. Stronger controls should be applied to areas of high impact or high risk. Security procedures should be reviewed regularly (at least annually) to ensure physical access is granted only to authorized individuals.</p>
<p><strong>8. “Information security controls are not adequate.”</strong></p>
<p>The sole purpose of information security controls is to prevent unauthorized use and access. When such controls fail, the system must be improved or replaced to be provide adequate protection to information which is guaranteed under U.S. law. Security controls should be tested annually with higher risk systems tested more frequently. Personnel that test controls should be separate from the personnel that administer the controls regularly, to allow outside enforcement. Problems and improvements should be shared among agencies to promote awareness. All common security configurations should follow <a href="http://www.nist.gov/index.html">NIST</a> guidelines. Agencies must also consider how the public availability of information affects how government information is protected.</p>
<p><strong>9. “Inadequate protection of information accessed or processed remotely.”</strong></p>
<p>Mobile devices and the increasing use of <a href="../2009/10/27/data-protection-in-the-cloud-why-it-matters-and-how-it-affects-you-and-your-data/">cloud computing</a> technologies all government employees to access government information when working away from the office. Data must be protected equally when accessed from a computer at the agency and when accessed from a mobile device. Agencies should maintain an audit log of any information accessed or processed remotely. NIST encryption methods, two factor authentication, and automatic log outs after a certain period of inactivity should be employed. Agencies should ensure personnel understand the security risks involved with remotely accessing such information and have them sign a document denoting their privacy and security responsibilities.</p>
<p><strong>10. Agencies acquire information technology and information security products without incorporating appropriate security and privacy standards and guidelines. </strong></p>
<p>The <a title="CIPP Guide: E-Government Act of 2002" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2010/02/22/the-e-government-act-of-2002/" target="_blank">E-Government Act of 2002</a> requires that all new information security systems conduct Privacy Impact Assessments prior to use, and periodically thereafter in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the system in protecting the information it maintains. Failing to assess new technologies for their privacy protections leaves large holes in the security of the system. Agencies should include information system planning, development and maintenance in their procedures and budgets. Systems should be purchased and implemented only when found to be cost effective in adequately protecting information. Software and hardware encryption products should be used according to the NIST certified cryptographic modules.</p>
<p><strong>Summary</strong></p>
<p>While there are a number of regulations such as the Privacy Act of 1974, the E-Government Act of 2002, as well as the Fair Information Practice Principles which guide the use of information by the Federal Government, such regulations are not always implemented properly. Reports such as the Common Risks Impeding the Adequate Protection of Government Information are necessary to maintain an ongoing discussion regarding information privacy and security and continue to increase security protections as technologies and threats evolve.</p>
<p><em>CIPP/G Candidate Preparation</em></p>
<p>In preparation for the Certified Information Privacy Professional Government exam, a privacy professional should be comfortable with topics related to this post including:</p>
<ul>
<li>Common Risks Impeding the Adequate Protection of Government Information</li>
<li>Information Privacy Laws for U.S. Government Practice (I.C.)</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>All that Information, and So Personal</title>
		<link>http://www.cippguide.org/2010/02/16/all-that-information-and-so-personal/</link>
		<comments>http://www.cippguide.org/2010/02/16/all-that-information-and-so-personal/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Feb 2010 07:00:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>northrup64</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Facebook]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PII]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vanish]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cippguide.org/?p=1301</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Visiting the doctor’s office is a nightmare for the Data Privacy Professional. One glance at all that paper reaching as far as the eye can see and all containing so much PII.  Nancy Northrup discusses a new encryption product which shows potential for slowing the persistence of the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span style="font-size: small;"> </span></p>
<div id="_mcePaste">
<p>Visiting the doctor’s office is a nightmare for the Data Privacy Professional. One glance at all that paper reaching as far as the eye can see and all containing so much PII, is enough to get me humming the tune from the Monk series:</p>
</div>
<blockquote>
<div id="_mcePaste">It&#8217;s a jungle out there</div>
<div id="_mcePaste">Disorder and confusion everywhere</div>
<div>No one seems to care</div>
<div id="_mcePaste">Well I do</div>
<div id="_mcePaste">Hey, who&#8217;s in charge here?</div>
<div>It&#8217;s a jungle out there</div>
</blockquote>
<div id="_mcePaste">
<p>I’ve read all the news about eMedical, creating these great files. We all want our doctors operating (pardon the pun) on data driven decisions, but it’s scary too. Once in digital form, it is out there forever. Anyone heard of hackers, private databases being beyond court rules, low bid contractors doing the work, anything else we need to know?</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>But there is hope. Roxana Geambasu, a computer science graduate at the University of Washington in Seattle, is working on self-destructing data.  A simple form is email with a self-destructing life-span. It self destructs, forever.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>It’s called Vanish. It encrypts the data and it can be anywhere, email, photos, Facebook, etc. Then it places the “keys” around the internet. As they disappear, the message begins to disintegrate.  It’s like Voltemore’s Horcruxes (Oh, go read Harry Potter, you’re going to need those references very soon!).  The beauty is that all copies, even copies of copies, rot away, no matter where they are, on the internet, behind firewalls, wherever.</p>
</div>
<div id="_mcePaste">
<p>So until Vanish or something like it and better protections are in place, we have a bad situation. Just think about if someone is exonerated of a crime, they have the right to not mention the crime to a perspective employer. But with the wonders of the web, the criminal record is out there for the prospective employer to find. He won’t hire you and you won’t know why. Employers use private data bases that are unaffected by the court ruling that the data must be expunged. So start thinking about pre-existing or expensive conditions and trying to keep them under wraps. Is anyone else worried about the medical records or is it just me?</p>
</div>
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		<title>Popular encryption software flaw details published</title>
		<link>http://www.cippguide.org/2009/05/29/popular-encryption-software-flaw-details-published/</link>
		<comments>http://www.cippguide.org/2009/05/29/popular-encryption-software-flaw-details-published/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2009 11:00:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>jbrook</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[CIPP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hacking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CBC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cipher-block chaining]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CNPI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CTR]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gaven Watson]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IEEE Symposium]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kenny Paterson]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[man-in-the-middle]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Martin Albrecht]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[OpenSSH]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Royal Holloway]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[secure shell]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SSH]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[University of London]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cippguide.org/?p=661</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The recently unveiled flaw in SSH reiterates the idea that, no matter how good the technology, it will eventually fail from a whole host of threats.  In this case, the implementation flaw occurred in a software product that had been previously "proven secure".  Real world implementations are more complex than security models, and other mitigations must be in place when a design does finally [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As we mentioned in a recent <a title="Even with the best security products and ideas in place, plan for a problem that will inevitably arrise" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2009/05/19/hey-stupid-dont-just-throw-that-out-corporate-disposal-policies-keep-your-organization-out-of-the-headlines/" target="_blank">post on disposal policies</a>, someone, somewhere will eventually notice a problem in even the best security software.  As was the case with Secure Shell (SSH).  SSH is an encryption tool and was originally used as a secure alternative to remote command prompt software like rlogin or telnet.  Since it&#8217;s initial inception, additional features have been added that allow SSH to operate as a Swiss Army Knife for encryption.  As 80% of the total SSH deployments are actually OpenSSH, we will use the two interchangeably.  </p>
<p>Several years ago, using software engineering methods, University of California San Diego researchers demonstrated <a title="Breaking and provably repairing the SSH authenticated encryption scheme: A case study of the Encode-then-Encrypt-and-MAC paradigm " href="http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/yoshi/papers/SSH/" target="_blank">SSH is provably secure</a>.  And SSH has shown itself to be nearly as good as claimed, posting only 31 bugs since 1998, most of which were minor.  Until now&#8230;  Three researchers from the Royal Holloway Information Security Group (ISG) at the University of London, Martin Albrecht, Kenny Paterson and Gaven Watson, <a title="University of London Researchers publish Plaintext Recovery Attacks Against SSH" href="http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/SandPfinal.pdf" target="_blank">found flaws in the proof</a>.  They&#8217;ve shown that SSH is vulnerable to a <a title="Wikipedia: Man-in-the-middle attack circumvents security" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man_in_the_middle_attack" target="_blank">&#8220;Man-in-the-middle&#8221; attack</a>, where someone inserts themselves between a sender and receiver, grabs information, changes it and sends it along.</p>
<h3>The Problem</h3>
<p>There are actually three problems that account for the ISG discovered flaw:</p>
<ol>
<li>The first lies in the manner the original security models used for the proof were constructed. The original proof pre-supposes garbled information may simply be reset as a failure and will not impact the security of the encryption used to protect the data.  The model never distinguished between the various kinds of failure, but the failure information turns out to be accessible to an adversary.  </li>
<li>The second is an implementation decision made by the original software developers for SSH.  The developers had two choices: send how big the transmitted information is (packet length field) unencrypted, which gives a small amount of information that tells an attacker how much data they had to crack, or encrypt hacker detectable information in the packet length field, possibly creating a <a title="Wikipedia: Known Plaintext Attack" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Known-plaintext_attack" target="_blank">&#8220;known plaintext&#8221; attack</a> and thereby decreasing the <a title="Key space referrs to the total number of keys available.  Think of it as a big key ring, and in order to open the door, you must try every key on the ring.  Wikipedia's definition is here" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keyspace" target="_blank">keyspace</a>.  SSH&#8217;s developers chose the unknown.  </li>
<li>The last problem has to deal with encryption modes and feedback loops.  In order to efficiently create and keep an encrypted tunnel between two computers hard to break, information from the current set of mathematical operations is used to incrementally change the next set, preventing various <a title="SANS reading room: explanation of various types of cryptographic attacks" href="http://www.giac.org/resources/whitepaper/cryptography/57.php" target="_blank">encryption attacks</a>.  What data are taken from the current packet and fed into the next depend on the &#8220;<a title="Wikipedia: block cipher modes of operation" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_modes_of_operation" target="_blank">cryptographic mode</a>&#8221; chosen.  By default, SSH uses cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode instead of counter (CTR) mode.<span id="more-661"></span></li>
</ol>
<h3>Exploiting the ssh flaws</h3>
<p>The ISG researchers took the error information reported that the proof never accounted for, and the design decision made by SSH developers, and began tinkering.  They eventually found a method of reducing the security in the default settings of SSH.  They reduced the overall security by creating a guessing game where an attacker has a one in 262,144 chance of success versus a brute force attempt at 1 in 4.2 billion  (2^18 vs 2^32).  You&#8217;ll only recover a very small amount of information using this method (14 or 32 bits), but it is enough to be useful.  The researchers&#8217; vulnerability was first announced in November 2008, when the UK Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CNPI) simply could not ignore the problem and, working with the ISG, issued a <a title="CPNI Vulnerability Advisory SSH" href="http://www.cpni.gov.uk/docs/vulnerability_advisory_ssh.txt" target="_blank">CPNI advisory</a>.  Full details of the flaw were not announced until this month, when the researchers presented at an IEEE Symposium in California.</p>
<h3>Vulnerability mitigation strategies</h3>
<p>Even though the attack will work &#8220;with probability 1&#8243; in some circumstances, it&#8217;s somewhat difficult to pull-off in general, and is about as stealthy as a freight train.  OpenSSH v 5.2 and above should not be susceptible to this particular exploit.  According to the CPNI advisory, the SSH flaw may be mitigated in current SSH versions by using CTR mode instead of the default CBC mode.  </p>
<h3>Takeaway</h3>
<p>This same technology reliance problem shows up repeatedly.  Use new equipment and products to increase efficiency, but do not over-rely on automation and technology.  Someone somewhere will notice of something unexpected, even with proven secure products.  Audit system results and write policies to take into account that the technology eventually will fail, not just from hackers or even questionable coding decisions &#8211; hurricanes, fires and employee clumsiness can all accomplish the same thing.  If your systems fail, any private information exposed will cost money &#8211; in breach notifications, time resetting the systems and general reputation.   The ISG researchers summed up the situation succintly in their paper: </p>
<blockquote><p>Unfortunately, it seems that <strong>real world</strong> cryptographic <strong>implementations</strong> <strong>are more complex </strong><strong>than the</strong> current <strong>security models</strong> for SSH handle.</p></blockquote>
<p> </p>
<h3>CIPP Candidate Preparation</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal">In preparation for the Certified Information Privacy Professional exam, a privacy professional should be comfortable with topics related to this post including:</p>
<ul>
<li>Managing Risk and compliance (Foundations:I.G.b) including: Privacy Policy Development, Risk Management, Compliance</li>
<li>Information Security (Foundations: II.C) including: Encryption (data-in-motion) and Threats &amp; Vulnerabilities</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>EXCLUSIVE:  Interview with Heartland Payment Systems&#039; Executive Director, Mr. Steven Elefant</title>
		<link>http://www.cippguide.org/2009/05/28/exclusive-interview-with-heartland-payment-systems-executive-director-mr-steven-elefant/</link>
		<comments>http://www.cippguide.org/2009/05/28/exclusive-interview-with-heartland-payment-systems-executive-director-mr-steven-elefant/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2009 13:06:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>jbrook</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Compliance & Regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[breach notification]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data security standard]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Department of Homeland Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DHS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DSS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[end to end encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FS-ISAC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Heartland Payment Systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PA-DSS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[payment card industry]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PCI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Steven Elefant]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cippguide.org/?p=469</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[We had a chance to talk with Mr. Steven Elefant, Executive Director of end-to-end security at Heartland Payment Systems shortly after the security breach reportedly affecting hundreds of millions of credit card transactions. While the complete interview is available in the forums, we include a few excerpts in the articles section of the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We had a chance to talk with Mr. Steven Elefant, Executive Director of end-to-end security at <a title="CIPP Guide: Heartland Payment Systems breach affects hundreds of millions" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2009/01/21/hundreds-of-millions-of-private-records-stolen-from-heartland-payment-systems/" target="_blank">Heartland Payment Systems shortly after the security breach reportedly affecting hundreds of millions of credit card transactions</a>.  While the complete interview is available in the forums, here are a few excerpts:<br />
________________________________________</p>
<p><strong>Mr. Elefant, would you please tell me a little bit about your background?</strong></p>
<p>I’ve been in and around payments for 20 plus years.  I started a company called IC Verify which was the first PC payment software company in the 80’s doing credit cards, ATM / debit and check processing on personal computers. We rolled that out to 250K merchants in 21 countries with a half dozen languages.  ICVerify was merged with CyberCash, and I became the vice chairman of CyberCash. After leaving CyberCash, I was involved in several other startups including a company called Price Radar in the online auction space, a digital content management and micro payments company called Yaga and then venture capital for the last five years before joining Heartland Payment Systems.</p>
<p>________________________________________</p>
<p><strong>So the division you’re handling is the payment systems?</strong><br />
I am the executive director of end-to-end encryption.  This position touches on many aspects of Heartland’s diverse business.</p>
<p>________________________________________</p>
<p><strong>As far as the end-to-end encryption, first, what do you think of the media’s treatment of Heartland?  From my perspective, with a little time in journalism, the story was ‘if it bleeds, it leads’…  that seems to be the mantra and the announcements that went on with Heartland incident, the media absolutely had a field day.  What was the actual severity of the breach, and was it as bad as the media portrayed?</strong></p>
<p>We seem to be turning the tide. We’ve been proactive in leading industry change, sharing information and furthering the development of end-to-end encryption as a key element that will help the industry be more secure.<br />
________________________________________</p>
<p><strong>What do you think of the PCI DSS?  Does it go far enough?  Obviously, with Visa putting you guys and RBS on probation… What was the disconnect, and what do you think of the PCI DSS?</strong></p>
<p>Heartland was PCI certified every year it was assessed.  Yet our system was breached, showing that the standards did not fully protect data.  It may well be that no set of standards ever could fully protect data in this environment  &#8212; where motivated criminals develop ever more sophisticated ways to infiltrate systems.   We are working on new approaches to enhance security.<br />
_______________________________________</p>
<p><strong>So it’s just the application itself has to be certified and you guys are going above and beyond that throwing in the end-to-end encryption to take care of everything that’s not currently called out in the PCI-DSS?</strong></p>
<p>Yes. What we’re doing is from the time the digits leave the mag stripe, as they are read through that read head, they will be encrypted with very strong TRSM (Tamper Resistant Security Module) and AES encryption. Through the terminal, over the wires, through our hosts and through the card brands, the transaction will be encrypted – as long as the brands agree to do this.</p>
<p>________________________________________</p>
<p><strong>As far as the price tag for a breach, what are we looking at as far as potential sanctions from the PCI, I’m not talking about specifically about Heartland, but in general terms if you can’t talk about Heartland, what are we looking at as a breach?  We’re talking sanctions, breach notifications, brand harm – what do you see as the final price tag?</strong></p>
<p>Breaches are expensive in all of those categories and more.  The results of some past breaches are publicly available.  I don’t’ know how to answer your question about a specific price tag.  It’s still TBD.<br />
________________________________________</p>
<p><strong>A pretty consistent theme in my reading and at conferences is people saying, “The reason we’re doing all this security work is for compliance &#8211; we’re trying to comply with the governmental regulations rather than trying to do what’s in the best interest of protecting the customer.”  Because there are risk tradeoffs, how do you weigh between the privacy of the user and the compliance with whatever regulation?</strong></p>
<p>I think compliance and security go hand in hand.  Compliance, though, is not enough in and of itself.  That is why we are working to enhance the existing industry standards.   We are also working with ANSI X9 F6 t to help create greater security around PAN&#8217;s as well as the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) and the Payments Processing Information Sharing Council (PPISC) to share threat information and protect the entire industry, business owners and consumers<br />
________________________________________</p>
<p><strong>So one of the reasons for the CIPP Guide website is to serve as a resource for the privacy professional certification.  What do you think of certification programs, both in general as far as technology certifications go?</strong></p>
<p>I think they’re very important.  The education process that goes on within the industry has to be an ongoing one.  It’s not a one-time thing.  The industry changes and evolves, and the threat vectors change. This is a continuous process the industry needs to continue to support.<br />
________________________________________</p>
<p><strong>It definitely seems like you guys are moving in the right direction.  As I said earlier, it’s unfortunate that the media gets a hold of these things, because, I seem to recall that the information that was lost was bad, but not so bad that it was going to bring about the end of the financial market.</strong></p>
<p>We are trying to do things that benefit our business, the entire industry, merchants and consumers.</p>
<p><a title="The complete interview with Mr. Steven Elefant, Executive Director with Heartland Payment Systems may be found in the CIPP Guide Forums" href="http://www.cippguide.com/forum" target="_blank">The complete interview with Mr. Steven Elefant, including more details on PCI and his thoughts on compliance is available in the CIPP Guide forums.</a></p>
<p>Ed. note:  Before the interview, <a title="Visa Chief Enterprise Risk Officer says Heartland not PCI DSS compliant" href="http://www.corporate.visa.com/md/dl/documents/downloads/EllenRichey09SummitRemarks.pdf" target="_blank">Visa had revoked Heartland&#8217;s PCI compliant status as of March 13th, 2009</a>.  According to Visa&#8217;s website, <a title="Visa says Heartland Payment Systems is PCI DSS compliant again as of April 30, 2009" href="http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/cisp-list-of-pcidss-compliant-service-providers.pdf" target="_blank">Heartland apparently regained their PCI compliant status as of April 30, 2009</a>.  As of May 7, 2009, the <a title="Heartland Payment Systems breach estimated over $12.5 million" href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/05/heartland-breach-cost-company-126-million-so-far/" target="_blank">Heartland breach reportedly cost over $12.5 Million</a>.</p>
<span class="sfforumlink"><a href="http://www.cippguide.org/forum/ask-the-experts/exclusive-interview-with-heartland-payment-systems-executive-director-mr-steven-elefant/"><img src="http://www.cippguide.org/wp-content/plugins/simple-forum/styles/icons/default/bloglink.png" alt="" /> Join the forum discussion on this post</a> - (1) Posts</span>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Proposed bill shows State&#039;s Rights sometimes fall to bad federal legislation</title>
		<link>http://www.cippguide.org/2009/05/27/proposed-bill-shows-states-rights-sometimes-fall-to-bad-federal-legislation/</link>
		<comments>http://www.cippguide.org/2009/05/27/proposed-bill-shows-states-rights-sometimes-fall-to-bad-federal-legislation/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2009 16:17:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>jbrook</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[CIPP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Compliance & Regulations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Attorney General]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bobby Rush]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[breach notification]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Consumer Protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Data Accountability and Trust Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Federal Trade Commission]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FTC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HR 2221]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Maine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[state's rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[unfair and deceptive trade practices]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.cippguide.org/?p=664</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Proposed legislation H.R. 2221 by Illinois Representative Rush seeks to preempts more restrictive privacy laws on the books in several states.  While the Data Accountability and Trust Act handles several important information privacy issues, the State's Rights infringement could hurt citizens' [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span><span>In the United States, we’re dependent on the overlapping and sometimes confusing patchwork of legislation and regulations because the US employs a <a title="FCC's warning includes highlights of sectoral privacy approach" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2009/03/03/fcc-to-telecoms-protect-customers-privacy-or-expect-fines/" target="_blank">sectoral</a> versus </span></span><span><span><a title="EU Legal action brought against UK highlights comprehensive privacy approach" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2009/04/16/eu-begins-legal-action-against-uk-over-privacy/" target="_blank">comprehensive</a> approach to privacy.<span>  </span>This legal patchwork sometimes includes state laws in addition to federal, which most see as simply another hurdle towards doing business in that state.<span>  In some cases</span>, related but more stringent laws in the state were already passed.  In those situations only minor modifications are needed for state compliance with a newly signed federal statute.</span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>The Federal Trade Commission and State Attorneys General enforce federal and state laws of consumer privacy protection for Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices (UDTP).</span><span>  </span>One recent example was the <a title="Example of state consumer protection laws more restrictive than federal laws" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2008/12/31/consumer-protection-laws-states-trump-federal/" target="_blank">State of </a><a title="Example of state consumer protection laws more restrictive than federal laws" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2008/12/31/consumer-protection-laws-states-trump-federal/" target="_blank">Maine</a><a title="Example of state consumer protection laws more restrictive than federal laws" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2008/12/31/consumer-protection-laws-states-trump-federal/" target="_blank">’s consumer protections, which are more restrictive than the federal laws</a> with respect to cigarette labeling.<span>  </span>The State brought suit against a tobacco manufacturer for violating the state’s deceptive trade law, which the manufacturer argued was out of line due to the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act.<span>  </span>The <a title="Supreme Court decision upholds State's Right to pass legislation more restrictive than federal law" href="http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-562.pdf" target="_blank">Supreme Court decision upheld the State’s right to pass more restrictive legislation</a>, pointing out:<span>  </span></p>
<blockquote>
<p class="CM4"><span>Neither the Labeling Act’s pre-emption provision nor the Federal Trade Commission’s actions in this field pre-empt respondents’ state law fraud claim. Pp. 5–20. </span></p>
<p class="Default"><span><span> </span>(a) <strong>Congress may indicate pre-emptive intent</strong><strong> </strong>through a statute’s express language or through its structure and purpose. See <em>Jones </em>v. <em>Rath Packing Co., </em>430 U. S. 519, 525. When the text of an express pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily “accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.” </span></p>
</blockquote>
<p class="Default">The rationale in (a) requires express language for a federal law to negate a State’s right to create more restrictive legislation.<span>  </span>The first citing by the high court becomes the <a title="New York Times' opinion that House Bill 2221 bad for State's Rights and consumer privacy in general" href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/opinion/25mon2.html" target="_blank">contentious issue for House Bill H.R. 2221</a>, proposed by Illinois Representative Bobby Rush.<span>  </span>The bill tackles several tough interstate commerce issues, placing the FTC in charge of disposal regulations for <a title="Examples of abandoned paper records containing personal information" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2009/04/09/abandoned-medical-records-happen-will-abandoned-ehr-happen-more/" target="_blank">obsolete or abandoned paper records containing personal information</a>, <a title="Interview offers breach notification opinion from IBM Privacy Partner and former IRS Privacy Director Barbra Symonds" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2008/06/12/an-interview-with-barbra-symonds-ibm-associate-partner-in-security-privacy-it-governance" target="_blank">breach notifications</a> and verification requirements for information brokers.<span>  </span>Section 6 of the so-called <a title="Proposed House Bill HR 2221 proposed by Illinois Representative Bobby Rush" href="http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.2221:" target="_blank">Data Accountability and Trust Act</a> includes a provision reading:</p>
<blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span> (a) …This Act supersedes any provision of a statute, regulation, or rule of a State or political subdivision of a State, with respect to those entities covered by the regulations issued pursuant to this Act, that expressly&#8211;</span></p>
<ol>
<li>requires information security practices and treatment of data in electronic form containing personal information similar to any of those required under section 2; and</li>
<li>requires notification to individuals of a breach of security resulting in unauthorized acquisition of data in electronic form containing personal information.</li>
</ol>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>(b) Additional Preemption-</span></p>
<ol>
<li>IN GENERAL- No person other than the Attorney General of a State may bring a civil action under the laws of any State if such action is premised in whole or in part upon the defendant violating any provision of this Act. </li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<p class="Default">This would strike several of the state privacy and notification laws (possibly including California&#8217;s SB 1386), stripping the State’s rights and growing Washington’s power.<span>  </span>It also bars the State Attorneys General from bringing suit, possibly in an effort to avoid a double jeopardy situation.<span>  </span>There are numerous case studies of the FTC and State Attorneys General working hand-in-hand for consumer protection; why this law tries to hamstring the situation is a bit of a mystery.</p>
<p class="Default">One more interesting note on Representative Rush’s proposal &#8211; the bill also places an encryption exemption on breach notification.<span>  </span>As we noted in a recent post on <a title="Corporate disposal policies should include provisions for security obsolescene such as old encryption implementations" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2009/05/19/hey-stupid-dont-just-throw-that-out-corporate-disposal-policies-keep-your-organization-out-of-the-headlines/" target="_blank">corporate disposal policies</a>, hackers and researchers seem to notice protection missteps and use them to bypass security provisions just like encryption.</p>
<blockquote>
<p class="Default">The encryption of data in electronic form shall establish a presumption that no reasonable risk of identity theft, fraud, or other unlawful conduct exists following a breach of security of such data. Any such presumption may be rebutted by facts demonstrating that the encryption has been or is reasonably likely to be compromised.</p>
</blockquote>
<p class="Default">The law has a 10 year lifespan, which should be a decent requirement before the <a title="Wikipedia: Advanced Encryption Standard controls confidentiality through cryptography" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard" target="_blank">Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)</a>, currently the de-facto encryption standard (and as yet to be compromised), ages beyond its effectiveness.</p>
<p class="Default">Update: President Obama&#8217;s <a title="Presidential Memo on preemption says States' Rights are very important" href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Presidential-Memorandum-Regarding-Preemption/" target="_blank">May 20th, 2009 Memorandum on the Subject of Preemption</a> and State&#8217;s Rights quotes Justice Brandeis saying, &#8221;[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.&#8221;</p>
<h3>CIPP Candidate Preparation</h3>
<p class="MsoNormal">In preparation for the Certified Information Privacy Professional exam, a privacy professional should be comfortable with several topics found in this post including:</p>
<ul>
<li>Regulatory Authorities (CIPP: I.A.c) including: The Federal Trade Commission</li>
<li>Enforcement of U.S. Privacy and Security Laws (CIPP: II.B.d, I.A.c) including: Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices (UDTP), and enforcement powers under the FTC Act section 5 </li>
<li>Privacy and Data Protection Regulation (Foundations: I.F.a, I.F.b) including: Sectoral legal framework </li>
<li>National data protection regimes (Foundations: I.F.b) including: State&#8217;s Rights </li>
<li>Specific Privacy and Security laws (CIPP: I.B.g) including: Breach notification</li>
<li>Information Security (Foundations: II.C) including: Encryption</li>
</ul>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Secure Messaging Gateway: An Ironport Review</title>
		<link>http://www.cippguide.org/2008/03/26/secure-messaging-gateway-an-ironport-review/</link>
		<comments>http://www.cippguide.org/2008/03/26/secure-messaging-gateway-an-ironport-review/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Mar 2008 13:38:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>jbrook</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[email gateway]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[encrypted email]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ironport]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mail gateway security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Postini]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Security Incident Management]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[<p>Over the weekend, I did a lot of reading on a company in the mail gateway business called Ironport.   I mean a lot of reading.   This was another consolidation (see Why behemoths buy startups &#38; March 08&#8242;s Information Security Magazine&#8217;s Schneier/Ranum Face Off), with Cisco snatching up the market leader.</p>
<p>I read about capabilities, product offerings, market penetrations, strategic positioning, competitors and magic quadrants.  All of this was at the urging of a friend of mine at Cisco, and how this product would drive profits for the company for the next several quarters.</p>
<p>I did a similar [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Over the weekend, I did a lot of reading on a company in the mail gateway business called Ironport.   I mean a <font style="font-style: italic">lot</font> of reading.   This was another consolidation (see <a href="http://www.ecademy.com/node.php?id=68989">Why behemoths buy startups</a> &amp; March 08&#8242;s Information Security Magazine&#8217;s <a href="http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/magazineFeature/0,296894,sid14_gci1303850,00.html">Schneier/Ranum Face Off</a>), with Cisco snatching up the market leader.</p>
<p>I read about capabilities, product offerings, market penetrations, strategic positioning, competitors and magic quadrants.  All of this was at the urging of a friend of mine at Cisco, and how this product would drive profits for the company for the next several quarters.</p>
<p>I did a similar exercise for my boss with respect to Postini, and their SOA mail security capabilities purchased by Google in 2006 (More on Postini in a future post).  I expect his interest is due to the encrypted email gateway.</p>
<p>So what did I learn.  First, both of these guys lay claim to reputation based filtering.  One holds the patent (Postini, more on this in a later post) and one has it widely implemented, maybe even longer than the patent was applied for (if so, of course that would invalidate the patents).</p>
<p>Gartner thinks Postini would only use those patents defensively.  I wonder what would happen if a new Executive management team came in at the search giant&#8230;  Cisco has deep pockets, but Google&#8217;s &#8220;do no evil&#8221; mantra should keep this out of litigation.  Why?  Because Ironport gateways are installed worldwide, and their reputation filters handle 5 Billion email messages.  Per day!  They calculate that&#8217;s over 40% of the mail traffic worldwide.  From that traffic analysis, they push threat updates in near real time (every 5 mins).</p>
<p>I&#8217;d say that is doing no evil.   John Chambers likes monopolies.  Ish (for the Justice Department and the Sherman Anti-trust Act).  Cisco has 80% of the router and switch market.  A lot of companies say &#8216;Does it have a Cisco tag on it?  Yes?  Then it can come into my network&#8230;&#8217;</p>
<p>In addition to the reputation filters, Ironport has several other unique features.  They built their gateways on a modified FreeBSD OS they call AsycOS.   AsycOS&#8217; security includes a limited port attack surface, reputation based filtering at the connection level, an LDAP/Active Directory integration that drops mail for invalid addresses without the Exchange &amp; Notes wasting their CPU cycles and disk space.  Performance enhancements include a non-blocking I/O write cache (disk access IO is their major bottleneck), and intelligent mail transfers (check to see if a domain is up before sending), and per receiving domain message queuing.  Lastly are the management features, including an intuitive, web based GUI (it really is pretty simple), a three tiered rule set deployment, and a peer-to-peer control structure.  For disconnected users, there&#8217;s also an email gateway.  And of course, they have tons of case studies from recognizable names like Dell, Virgin, Ryder, Johns Hopkins, etc&#8230;</p>
<p>I expect Cisco will increase Ironport&#8217;s distribution throughout the messaging space.  Now we just need Microsoft to buy Tumbleweed (the other upper right magic quadrant product) and the big mergers and acquisitions will be complete.</p>
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		<title>Want to avoid wiretaps or questionable search and seizure? Try a secure computer on USB</title>
		<link>http://www.cippguide.org/2007/10/08/want-to-avoid-wiretaps-or-questionable-search-and-seizure-try-a-secure-computer-on-usb/</link>
		<comments>http://www.cippguide.org/2007/10/08/want-to-avoid-wiretaps-or-questionable-search-and-seizure-try-a-secure-computer-on-usb/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Oct 2007 17:11:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>jbrook</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Secure Computing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Virtual Machine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[xB]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[<p>Everyone wants a certain comfort level, especially with computers.  You like finding your programs on your system.  You want your bookmarks in FireFox or your buddy list on Instant Messenger.  What if you were able to do carry all of this on a USB thumb drive?  In fact, what if you were able to bring your entire &#8220;computer&#8221; with you on a USB memory stick?  How could you hope to secure it against viruses, keystroke loggers, or even un-trusted/hostile networks?  What about other users poking around for your files, or maybe reading your emails?</p>
<p>Not [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Everyone wants a certain comfort level, especially with computers.  You like finding your programs on your system.  You want your bookmarks in FireFox or your buddy list on Instant Messenger.  What if you were able to do carry all of this on a USB thumb drive?  In fact, what if you were able to bring your entire &#8220;computer&#8221; with you on a USB memory stick?  How could you hope to secure it against viruses, keystroke loggers, or even un-trusted/hostile networks?  What about other users poking around for your files, or maybe reading your emails?</p>
<p>Not long ago, I watched a show on Bravo called &#8220;Flipping Out&#8221; (actually my wife watches, and I&#8217;m in the room…  honest.) where the protagonist, <a href="http://www.bravotv.com/Flipping_Out/episodes/episode_105/index.php">Jeff Lewis&#8217; computer was changed by an employee</a>, and Jeff couldn&#8217;t use anything.  Sarah Jessica Parker&#8217;s character in &#8220;Sex and the City&#8221; had a nervous breakdown when she had to go to a new computer.  The success of the <a href="http://www.geeksquad.com/tools/supporttool.aspx?id=439&amp;PSRCH">Geek Squad</a>, and a quick Google search for Computer Help show it&#8217;s a big problem.  Microsoft made a big deal of their <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/using/windowsvista/ballew_upgrade.mspx">Windows Easy Transfer</a> upgrade process from Vista to XP.  You should be able to see where a &#8220;portable&#8221; computer could be useful, especially if you travel a lot.  I&#8217;m talking smaller than just a laptop.</p>
<p>One of the earlier &#8220;modern&#8221; portable OSes was a minimized Linux distribution designed to fit on a CD.  <a href="http://www.knopper.net/knoppix/index-en.html">Knoppix</a> was one of the first &#8220;computers&#8221; compacted enough to be portable with features like OpenOffice, web browsers, and email access expected in a recent desktop.  However, the security provisions were originally lax.  Now, with Virtual Machines (VM) from <a href="http://www.vmware.com/">VMWare,</a> <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen">Xen,</a> and <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/windows/products/winfamily/virtualpc/default.mspx">Microsoft</a> all the rage, you&#8217;d expect several possibilities.  I&#8217;d like to discuss one in particular, designed <em><strong>completely</strong></em> around security.</p>
<p>A few of the guys from the <a href="http://www.cultdeadcow.com/">Cult of the Dead Cow,</a> the security researchers/hackers that released Back Orifice to Microsoft&#8217;s dismay in the 90&#8242;s, started a quest for a secure portable computing system.  Steve Topletz created <a href="http://xerobank.com/xB_machine.html"> xB</a> as a result of this work, and demonstrated the product at <a href="http://www.portableprivacy.net/2007/08/defcon-15-review.html">DefCon 15</a>.  The description of the product from the xB website:</p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;xB Machine is the Secure Virtual Workstation™ that provides a safe computing environment for personal, professional, and corporate use. It is the ultimate user security and privacy tool, and the flagship of the XeroBank product line-up. Use it for safe and anonymous internet, surfing, email, encrypted messaging, and financial transactions. Put your computer in your pocket by placing xB Machine on a flash drive; thanks to virtualization technology it will be the same no matter where or on what computer you run it.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
<p>So what does a system like this give <em>you</em>?  Probably not much unless you&#8217;re paranoid, but the idea is nearly complete anonymity.  The encryption on this system is stronger than what the NSA requires for Top Secret information.  In fact, the Advanced Encryption Standard cryptography should be <a href="http://www.keylength.com/en/compare/">sufficient protection for the next 20 years.</a>  This protects against immediate disclosure of the system in case of a lost or stolen key.  There is also a zeroize feature, where if you enter a password the entire key will erase itself.  The software pre-loaded on the system also pushes anonymization, as well as network connections incapable of snooping.</p>
<p>From what I&#8217;ve seen, the system takes care of data at rest, in transit, and in use.  The only thing I can think of is sharing data appropriately.  There are devices on the anonymous TOR network that could allow secure file transfer through SFTP.  There are applications for this work, although its release makes Intelligence collection (think terrorists) nearly impossible when used.  Then again, newspaper advertisements work even better.  Anyone seen <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0401997/">Breach?</a>  In using the system, my observation is its speed is a bit slow.  But think about what you get.  How paranoid must you be before you find this necessary?</p>
<p>Why would someone create such a cloak and dagger machine?  We live in a capitalist society, and although this does contribute to the security body of knowledge, my guess for the real reason for the system:  sales of the high speed XeroBank anonymous network connections.  Everyone has their motives, and people will pay especially when it comes to security.</p>
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