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><channel><title>CIPP Guide &#187; Information Security</title> <atom:link href="http://www.cippguide.org/tag/information-security/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><link>https://www.cippguide.org</link> <description>Your Guide to the CIPP</description> <lastBuildDate>Thu, 02 Feb 2012 12:00:03 +0000</lastBuildDate> <language>en</language> <sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod> <sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency> <generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1</generator> <item><title>InfoSec Risks, Threats, Vulnerabilities &amp; Countermeasures</title><link>https://www.cippguide.org/2011/11/22/infosec-risks-threats-vulnerabilities-countermeasures/</link> <comments>https://www.cippguide.org/2011/11/22/infosec-risks-threats-vulnerabilities-countermeasures/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Tue, 22 Nov 2011 12:00:43 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>hannah</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category> <category><![CDATA[attacks]]></category> <category><![CDATA[controls]]></category> <category><![CDATA[countermeasures]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[risks]]></category> <category><![CDATA[SANS]]></category> <category><![CDATA[security controls]]></category> <category><![CDATA[threats]]></category> <category><![CDATA[vulnerabilities]]></category><guid
isPermaLink="false">https://www.cippguide.org/?p=2665</guid> <description><![CDATA[This article takes a closer look at infosec risks, threats, attacks, vulnerabilities and countermeasures/security controls. It differentiates between the concepts and provides industry-standard definitions for each. The article also explores four basic categories of countermeasures/security controls: preventative, reactive, detective and administrative. Finally, the article examines the ‘Risks = Threats X Vulnerabilities X Impact’ formula from a critical [...]]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When discussing infosec, confusion in terminology is a common issue. It’s important to be clear on the terms used in this conversation. This article will take a closer look at infosec risks, threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures. It will also briefly discuss the well-known formula used to describe these concepts.</p><p><strong>Terminology</strong></p><p>One way to think of risks is the possibility for a problem to arise. Essentially, risk is the potential for realization of an unwanted negative consequence, but they are not problems in and of themselves. <a
href="http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/threats/risk-eye-security-guy_1380">According to SANS</a>,</p><p>“Thinking about risks as ‘potential problems’ sets the stage for the manager or analysis team to make decisions to avoid such problems. If a risk has become a problem, it is too late for mitigation. Action is warranted right away for problems. If risk management has been successful, that action has been planned, rehearsed and budgeted.”</p><p>It’s common to see the terms threat, attack and vulnerability being interchanged and used incorrectly. Basic definitions of these concepts are provided below, as defined in Gregory’s <a
href="http://www.amazon.ca/CISSP-Guide-Security-Essentials-Gregory/dp/1435428196"><em>CISSP Guide to Security Essentials</em></a>:</p><ul><li>Threat – the expressed potential for the occurrence of a harmful event such as an attack</li><li>Attack – an action taken against a target with the intention of doing harm</li><li>Vulnerability – a weakness that makes targets susceptible to an attack</li></ul><p><strong>Countermeasures</strong></p><p>Security controls are also referred to as technical or administrative safeguards, or countermeasures. The goal of countermeasures are to counteract, or minimize loss of unavailability as a result of threats acting on their associated vulnerability. The <a
href="http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/ai12.19.6.pdf">GAO describes</a> this as,</p><p>“The control environment sets the tone of an organization, influencing the control consciousness of its people. It is the foundation for all other components of internal control, providing discipline and structure. Control environment factors include the integrity, ethical values, and competence of the entity’s people; management’s philosophy and operating style; and the way management assigns authority and organizes and develops its people.”</p><p>There are four basic types of countermeasures:</p><ul><li>Preventative – These work by keeping something from happening in the first place. Examples of this include: security awareness training, firewall, anti-virus, security guard and IPS.</li><li>Reactive – Reactive countermeasures come into effect only after an event has already occurred.</li><li>Detective – Examples of detective counter measures include: system monitoring, IDS, anti-virus, motion detectors and IPS.</li><li>Administrative – These controls are the process of developing and ensuring compliance with policy and procedures. These use policy to protect an asset.</li></ul><p><strong>Risk/Threats/Vulnerabilities Formula </strong></p><p>We’ve all seen the information security risk analysis formula, which suggests that:</p><p
align="center">Risks = Threats X Vulnerabilities X Impact</p><p>Certain versions of this formula might substitute ‘consequence’ for ‘impact’ though the concept is essentially the same. <a
href="http://www.bloginfosec.com/2010/08/23/why-the-risk-threats-x-vulnerabilities-x-impact-formula-is-mathematical-nonsense/">Some security practitioners</a> argue that this equation does not make sense mathematically, nor is it applicable to the practice of infosec. Instead, it has its roots in decision theory, particularly in expected utility/value theory.</p><p>The expected utility or value of an action may be thought of as a weighted average. It can be determined by defining a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possible outcomes from a particular course of action, then multiplying the probability of each possible outcome by its utility. The formula is clear and mathematically rigorous.</p><p>By contrast, the ‘Risks = Threats X Vulnerabilities X Impact’ formula referred to above is unclear and mathematically incoherent. It is impossible to include these concepts into a mathematical formula. One simple question is: what are the units of measurement for threats and vulnerabilities? Or, what is the range of possible values for vulnerabilities?</p><p>In addition, the ‘Risks = Threats X Vulnerabilities X Impact’ formula fails to take into account all of the possible outcomes of a particular action. It focuses solely on security threats, and can only calculate for a single security threat at a time.</p><p>Perhaps the formula is not meant to be used as a mathematical formula, but rather as an informal way of stating that security risks is a function of threats, vulnerabilities and potential impact or consequence. In that case, the formula could use a revision for clarity’s sake.</p><p><strong>Summary </strong></p><p>This article takes a closer look at infosec risks, threats, attacks, vulnerabilities and countermeasures/security controls. It differentiates between the concepts and provides industry-standard definitions for each. The article also explores four basic categories of countermeasures/security controls: preventative, reactive, detective and administrative. Finally, the article examines the ‘Risks = Threats X Vulnerabilities X Impact’ formula from a critical perspective.</p><p><strong>CIPP Exam Preparation</strong></p><p>In preparation for the Certified Foundation Examination (Foundations), a privacy professional should be comfortable with topics related to this post, including:</p><ul><li>Information Security threats and vulnerabilities (II.A.d.)</li></ul> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>https://www.cippguide.org/2011/11/22/infosec-risks-threats-vulnerabilities-countermeasures/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Components of a Privacy Policy</title><link>https://www.cippguide.org/2011/08/09/components-of-a-privacy-policy/</link> <comments>https://www.cippguide.org/2011/08/09/components-of-a-privacy-policy/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Tue, 09 Aug 2011 17:00:41 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>hannah</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Notice]]></category> <category><![CDATA[opt-in]]></category> <category><![CDATA[PII]]></category> <category><![CDATA[privacy by policy]]></category> <category><![CDATA[privacy policy]]></category><guid
isPermaLink="false">https://www.cippguide.org/?p=2593</guid> <description><![CDATA[Enterprise privacy policies and privacy programs are essential. While policies alone cannot prevent data breaches or misuse of personal information, they are a good step in ensuring transparency and privacy-friendly practices. A privacy policy should contain the following key components: notice; consumer choice; access and correction; security; and [...]]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It seems that <a
href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy_policy">privacy policies</a>, notices and statements are everywhere these days. Given the increased public interest and more stringent <a
href="https://www.cippguide.org/tag/legislation/">legislation</a> on <a
href="http://www.cippguide.org/tag/infosec/">information security</a> and privacy protection, these privacy-friendly mechanisms are becoming more and more important on websites and online services. Generally, privacy policies, privacy notices and privacy statements tend to follow a specific format, use the same vocabulary and style.</p><p>It’s important to ensure that website privacy policies correctly address specific legal issues and technical implications of the company. There are numerous types of privacy policies out there, some of which apply to online data; others apply to data collected by financial institutions; others that deal with the collection of information from children under the age of 13; and other policies that apply to individuals protected under foreign laws. There is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to developing a sound privacy policy.</p><p><strong>Enterprise Privacy Programs</strong></p><p>Developing and maintaining enterprise-wide privacy programs require top-down cooperation and collaboration of the different individuals in an enterprise.</p><p>According to United States privacy legislation, all companies involved in obtaining, maintaining, using and/or disclosing personal information about consumers ought to adopt a privacy policy. Privacy policies are documents in which companies state their information practices. Such documents keep organizations accountable to a set of formal privacy policies. Companies may be the subject of an <a
href="http://www.cippguide.org/tag/FTC/">FTC</a> action or a lawsuit if their privacy practices do not accurately reflect those stated in their privacy policy.</p><p>Standardization of enterprise privacy programs is becoming more and more of an issue in recent years. Even though the primary objective of enterprise privacy policies is for internal use, standardization of such policies brings numerous advantages:</p><ul><li>Technical parts of regulations could be encoded into a standardized language</li><li>Enterprises with heterogeneous repositories of personal data could develop consistent enforcement tools to ensure compliance with internal privacy practices</li></ul><p><strong>Components of a Privacy Policy</strong></p><p>There are three main categories of information in a privacy policy:</p><ol><li><strong>1. </strong><strong>Policy Identification Details</strong></li></ol><p>This section defines the policy name, version and description.</p><ol><li><strong>2. </strong><strong>P3P-Based Components</strong></li></ol><p>This defines policy attributes that would apply if the policy is exported to a <a
href="https://www.cippguide.org/tag/p3p/">P3P</a> format. Such attributes would include: policy URLs, organization information, <a
href="https://www.cippguide.org/tag/PII/">PII</a> access and dispute resolution procedures.</p><ol><li><strong>3. </strong><strong>Policy Statements and Related Elements: Groups, Purposes and PII Types</strong></li></ol><p>Policy statements define the individuals able to access certain types of information, for certain pre-defined purposes.</p><p>Another way to classify the components of a privacy policy is outlined below.</p><ul><li><strong>Notice</strong> – Companies should provide consumers with clear, conspicuous notice that accurately describe their information practices.</li><li><strong>Consumer Choice</strong> – Companies should provide consumers with the opportunity to decide (in the form of opting-out) if it may disclose personal information to unaffiliated third parties.</li><li><strong>Access and Correction</strong> – Companies should provide consumers with the opportunity to access and correct personal information collected about the consumer.</li><li><strong>Security</strong> – Companies must adopt reasonable security measures in order to protect the privacy of personal information. Possible security measures include: administrative security, physical security and technical security.</li><li><strong>Enforcement</strong> – Companies should have systems through which they can enforce the privacy policy. This may be managed by the company, or an independent third party to ensure compliance. Examples include <a
href="https://www.cippguide.org/tag/bbbonline/">BBBOnLine</a> and <a
href="https://www.cippguide.org/tag/truste/">TRUSTe</a>.</li></ul><p><strong>Consumer’s Point of View</strong></p><p>From a consumer’s point of view, just because a website has a privacy policy doesn’t necessarily guarantee the security of the personal information. No privacy policy can definitely ensure the security of your information, or bind a company to those specific practices; however, there are certain policies that are better than others. A privacy policy should provide the consumer with a sense of transparency regarding the company.</p><p>Some important things that a consumer should consider when looking for good privacy policy include:</p><ul><li>What personal information is being collected?</li><li>How will your personal information be used?</li><li>How will your personal information be stored?</li><li>Are there security measures protecting your personal information?</li><li>How long will your personal information be kept by the company?</li><li>Will your personal information be shared with others?</li><li>How can you contact the company?</li></ul><p><strong>Summary</strong></p><p>This article takes a look at the importance of an enterprise privacy policies and privacy programs. While policies alone cannot prevent data breaches or misuse of personal information, they are a good step in ensuring transparency and privacy-friendly practices. A privacy policy should contain the following key components: notice; consumer choice; access and correction; security; and enforcement. The article also lists some considerations consumers should take when assessing the reliability of a company’s privacy policy.</p><p><strong>CIPP Exam Preparation</strong></p><p>In preparation for the Certified Information Privacy Professional/Information Technology (CIPP/IT) exam, a privacy professional should be comfortable with topics related to this post, including:</p><ul><li>Personally Identifiable Information (PII) (I.A.a.)</li><li>Consumer privacy concerns (II.A.a.)</li><li>Organizational privacy practices (II.A.b.)</li><li>Prominent notice and opt-in consent (II.B.b.)</li><li>Privacy mechanisms – privacy by policy (III.A.)</li></ul> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>https://www.cippguide.org/2011/08/09/components-of-a-privacy-policy/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>CIA Triad</title><link>https://www.cippguide.org/2010/08/03/cia-triad/</link> <comments>https://www.cippguide.org/2010/08/03/cia-triad/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Tue, 03 Aug 2010 12:00:53 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>hannah</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[CIPP]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Authentication]]></category> <category><![CDATA[CIA triad]]></category> <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Foundations]]></category><guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.cippguide.com/?p=2018</guid> <description><![CDATA[<p>The CIA triad is a well-known model in information security development. It is applied in various situations to identify problems or weaknesses and to establish security solutions. It is an industry standard that information systems professionals should be familiar with.</p> What is the CIA Triad?<p>The CIA triad refers to an information security model made up of the three main components: confidentiality, integrity and availability. Each component represents a fundamental objective of information security. In order to avoid confusion, the CIA triad is sometimes referred to as the AIC triad, or PAIN, which stands for privacy, availability/authentication, integrity and non-repudiation.</p><p>The three components [...]]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The CIA triad is a well-known model in <a
href="http://www.cippguide.com/tag/information-security/">information security</a> development. It is applied in various situations to identify problems or weaknesses and to establish security solutions. It is an industry standard that information systems professionals should be familiar with.</p><h2>What is the CIA Triad?</h2><p>The CIA triad refers to an information security model made up of the three main components: confidentiality, integrity and availability. Each component represents a fundamental objective of information security. In order to avoid confusion, the CIA triad is sometimes referred to as the AIC triad, or PAIN, which stands for privacy, availability/authentication, integrity and <a
href="http://www.cippguide.org/2010/07/27/cryptography/">non-repudiation</a>.</p><p>The three components of the triad are discussed below:</p><ol><li><strong>Confidentiality</strong>: This component is closely linked with privacy. This means that data are only available to the appropriate parties, which may be parties that require access to the data or parties that are trusted. Data that have been kept confidential means that they have not been compromised by other parties; confidential data are not disclosed to people who do not require them or who should not have access to them. Ensuring confidentiality means that information is organized in terms of who ought to have access as well as its sensitivity. A breach of confidentiality may take place through different means, for instance hacking or social engineering.</li><li><strong>Integrity</strong>: Data integrity refers to the certainty that the data are not tampered with during or after submission. It is the certainty that the data will not be modified or destroyed by unauthorized parties. This means there are two points during the transmission process during which the integrity could be compromised: during the upload or transmission of data; during the storage of the document in the database or collection.</li><li><strong>Availability</strong>: This means that the information is available when it is needed. In order for a system to demonstrate availability, it must have properly functioning computing systems, security controls and communication channels. The most available systems are accessible at all times and have safeguards against power outages, natural disasters, hardware failures and systems upgrades.</li></ol><p>Availability is a major challenge in collaborative environments as such environments must be stable and continually maintained. Such systems must also allow users to access required information with little waiting time. Redundant systems may be in place to offer a high level of fail-over. The concept of availability can also refer to the usability of a system.</p><p>Information security refers to the preservation of integrity and secrecy when information is stored or transmitted. Information security breaches occur when information is accessed by unauthorized individuals or parties. Breaches may be the result of actions of hackers, intelligence agencies, criminals, competitors, employees or others. In addition, individuals who value and wish to preserve their privacy are interested in information security.</p><h2>CIA Triad &amp; Privacy</h2><p>The fundamental security principles represented in the CIA triad ensure that both the data and the information system that processes the data are protected. The model takes into account different <a
href="http://www.cippguide.org/2010/07/22/access-controls/">controls</a>, physical security, technical security and human actions. Confidentiality, integrity and availability form three points of the information security triangle. The closer a system moves towards an apex, the further it is from the other two points. Thus, the CIA triad offers a useful model for the evaluation of technological choices. Put together, the triad preserves and protects sensitive information, whether it is personal or proprietary.</p><h2>Application</h2><p>Information security professionals must establish the issues around the CIA triad, enforce controls, develop preventative procedures and monitor data stored on those systems. The CIA triad ensures that protection takes place on three levels: the physical, personal and organizational. Professionals may apply the following to ensure high standards of information security:</p><ul><li><a
href="http://www.cippguide.com/tag/cryptography/">Cryptography</a>: this is the way in which raw data are encrypted as a scrambled form before they are transmitted or stored. They are then decrypted into the original form when an authorized individual needs to access the data. This is the primary tool of information security.</li><li>Mechanisms for data integrity, such as digital signatures and hash algorithms. These mechanisms for <a
href="http://www.cippguide.com/tag/authentication/">identity authentication</a> are important to ensure that only authorized people have access to the information.</li><li>High availability protocols, redundant network architectures and systems hardware designed to ensure reliability and robustness.</li></ul><h2>Blind Spots</h2><p>Although the CIA triad is a fundamental model for information security, it also focuses on a limited view of IT security that is centered on information. While the priority is to protect the information and ensure that data resources are available, the CIA model does not address prevention of an unauthorized person from using the system’s hardware resources.</p><p>Another issue is the information security professionals will concentrate on the “confidentiality” part of the triad, essentially ignoring the other components of a balanced security approach. For instance, when the “accessibility” component of the triad is neglected, this could mean severe disruptions to communications, costing millions and significantly impacting an industry. Thus, it is necessary for security professionals to contribute skills and knowledge during the purchasing and selection process for an organization’s communications network.</p><p>It is crucial to ensure that the CIA triad is applied in a balanced fashion. While all three elements are important, different elements of the triad will take priority depending on the industry and organization. During the security evaluations process of an information project, each of the three elements is marked relative to each other. In many cases, the objective is to find a balance between the three elements, not to achieve the highest possible score on the evaluation.</p><p>There are certain rules, such as if the confidentiality and integrity of the system increases, the availability score should decrease. This may be completely acceptable, depending on the context of the system. In this way, the CIA triad can be broad and flexible, meaning that it can be relevant to and implemented in any organization. The CIA triad could be applied to a user requesting use of their personal laptop at their workplace, or the introduction of a new password policy in a company.</p><p>Many information security professionals have also advocated expanding the CIA model to include the element of accountability. This may include logging and auditing of investigations and the ways that data is collected before and during a particular incident. Accountability may include non-repudiation, which proves the party that performs an activity, the scope of the action and when the action took place.</p><h3>Summary</h3><p>This article introduces the model of the CIA triad for designing and assessing information systems. It provides a discussion of the three main components of the triad: confidentiality, integrity and availability. This triad has been the basis of the information security industry for over twenty years. The article goes on to discuss the application of the CIA triad, for instance in cryptography, authentication and network architectures. Finally, the article provides some points of critique and suggested improvements for the CIA triad.</p><h3>Foundations Exam Preparation</h3><p>In preparation for the Certification Foundation exam, a privacy professional should be comfortable with topics related to this post, including:</p><ul><li>Elements of effective privacy management (I.G.b.)</li><li>Information security management (II.C.b.)</li></ul><p><a
class="a2a_dd a2a_target addtoany_share_save" href="http://www.addtoany.com/share_save#url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cippguide.org%2F2010%2F08%2F03%2Fcia-triad%2F&amp;title=CIA%20Triad" id="wpa2a_2"><img
src="https://www.cippguide.org/wp-content/plugins/add-to-any/share_save_171_16.png" width="171" height="16" alt="Share"/></a></p>]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>https://www.cippguide.org/2010/08/03/cia-triad/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>ISO 27000 Series</title><link>https://www.cippguide.org/2010/07/13/iso-27000-series/</link> <comments>https://www.cippguide.org/2010/07/13/iso-27000-series/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Tue, 13 Jul 2010 17:00:16 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>hannah</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[27000]]></category> <category><![CDATA[27001]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Compliance]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Foundations]]></category> <category><![CDATA[ISO]]></category> <category><![CDATA[standards]]></category><guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.cippguide.com/?p=2020</guid> <description><![CDATA[The ISO (International Organization for Standards) publishes international standards for the private sector.  The ISO 27000 standards series refers to information security matters. Since October 2005, the ISO has published six of these standards, with controls ranging from managing security systems to problem solving methodology to [...]]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The ISO (<a
href="http://www.iso.org/iso/home.html">International Organization for Standards</a>) publishes international standards for the private sector. It is made up of a network of standards institutes in 163 countries that are integrated with government structures in those countries. Standards are developed by specialist expert groups made up of members from business, industry, government, academia, consumer and other relevant groups.</p><p>The ISO standards work to facilitate trade; provide a basis for development, production and assessment of products; and to safeguard consumers who use products and services. The ISO produces standards for a wide range of industrial and commercial subjects. This article explores two ISO standards that are especially relevant to privacy professionals.</p><h2>ISO 27000 Series &amp; ISMS</h2><p>The ISO 27000 standards series refers to information security matters. Since October 2005, the ISO has published six of these standards:</p><ul><li>ISO 27001: this is a model for creating information security management systems (ISMS).</li><li>ISO 27002: this is a code of practices governing information security.</li><li>ISO 27003: this focuses on the PDCA (plan-do-check-act) problem solving method for ISMS. It has been proposed, but not yet published.</li><li>ISO 27004: this standard guides the development and assessment of ISMS, in alignment with the ISO 27002.</li><li>ISO 27005: this soon to be published standard discusses information security risk management.</li><li>ISO 27006: this regulates the accreditation of organizations that certify and register ISMS.</li></ul><p>The ISO 27000 series is closely linked to other standards, including:</p><ul><li>ISO 17021: this standard discusses the requirements for auditing and certifying management systems of various types. It is closely related to the ISO 27006.</li><li>ISO 13335: this discusses the management of information and communications technology security.  It is closely linked to the ISO 27005.</li><li>ISO 24760: when it is published, this standard will offer a framework for identity management. It is most related to the ISO 27002.</li></ul><p>Together, the ISO 27000 series of standards are used to plan, implement, certify and operate an ISMS. An ISMS, or information security management system, is a term unique to the ISO 27000 series. The term refers to a systematic approach for managing an organization’s sensitive information. An ISMS includes people, processes and information systems. Developing an ISMS ensures the following:</p><ul><li>The organization’s information assets are listed and secured.</li><li>Information security risks are managed and mitigated.</li><li>The organization’s security policies are implemented.</li><li>The organization is regularly assessed to ensure adherence to security measures.</li></ul><p><a
href="http://www.cippguide.com/tag/information-security/">Information security</a> involves three main components: <a
href="http://www.cippguide.org/2010/07/15/cia-triad/">confidentiality, integrity and availability</a>. Confidentiality refers to the level to which information is accessible to authorized individuals only. Integrity refers to the level of accuracy and completion of information. Integrity of information also ensures that it is not modified without knowledge and authorization. Availability or accessibility of information to authorized individuals is also necessary for information security.</p><h2>ISO 27001</h2><p>The ISO 27001, formally referred to as “Information Technology – Security Techniques – Information Security Management Systems – Requirements,” was published in October 2005. It replaces the former BS7799-2 standard. The previous standard was created in 1995 by the BSI (British Standards Institute), which helped to ensure that information security measures were effective. The BS7799-2 standard was developed as a technology-neutral and vendor-neutral system. This standard was taken as a Code of Practice, rather than as specific standards.</p><p>The standard outlines the specific requirements involved in establishing, implementing, monitoring, reviewing and improving a management system. It does not discuss information security-specific requirements, but offers a framework for management systems in various types of organizations, from commercial enterprises, to public service agencies and non-profit groups. The ISO 27001 uses the OECD principles which govern security of information and other network systems.</p><p>The ISO 27001 standard demands that an organization’s management carry out the following:</p><ol><li>Examine information security risks, paying attention especially to threats, vulnerabilities and impacts.</li><li>Develop and implement a complete set of information security controls and other protocols for dealing with risk.</li><li>Commit to an overarching management process to ensure that the information security controls adapt and grow with the organization.</li></ol><p>The ISO 27001 involves a number of PDCA cycles. The PDCA cycle is a statistical process for problem solving. It is applied within improvement programs to ensure that action is effective. The cycle involves:</p><ol><li>PLAN: identify the problems that are being faced. Brainstorm solutions to these problems.</li><li>DO: test problem-solving actions on a limited, experimental scale first. This will ensure that disruptions to regular operations are kept at a minimum.</li><li>CHECK: determine if the experimental actions are achieving a desired result. Monitor the quality of output continually to ensure that new problems are identified immediately.</li><li>ACT: once experimental actions are deemed effective, the changes should be implemented on a larger scale. This may mean that the new actions are integrated into daily routines and/or expanded to involve other individuals or departments in the organization.</li></ol><p>In order for an organization to be certified compliant with the ISO 27001, it must go through the following process. Initially, the organization must decide to start the certification process. During this stage, management must commit to the project and delegate responsibilities. Management would then develop and publish an organizational policy regarding the standards certification.</p><p>The organization then undertakes a scoping process, in which specific parts of the organization are covered by the ISMS. This determines which locations, assets or technologies will be included in the certification.</p><p>After the scoping process, the organization must carry out a risk assessment to identify strengths and means of addressing weaknesses, in terms of risk exposure. As a result, the organization produces a document outlining the method for managing risks. The procedures and policies are then implemented throughout the organization. Auditors from certification or registration bodies then carry out the verification of compliance.</p><h2>ISO 27002</h2><p>The ISO 27002, formally referred to as “Information Technology – Security Techniques – Code of Practice for Information Security Management,” was published in 2005. The standard is based on the UK standard, BS7799. The ISO 27002 and ISO 27001 are meant to be used together.</p><p>The objective of the ISO 27002 standard is to establish requirements and basic principles for implementing or changing an ISMS within an organization. The contents of this standard address the requirements of a risk assessment. It represents more of an advisory document, rather than a standard or formal specification. As such, any organization that adopts the ISO 27002 must identify their own information security risks and create appropriate controls, using the document as a framework.</p><p>The standard outlines thirty-nine control objectives that specify functional requirements. These control objectives form a basis for an organization to create principles for its own information security policies. The main sections or categories under which the control objectives fall are as follows:</p><ol><li><a
href="http://www.cippguide.org/2010/07/20/controlling-and-managing-risk/">Risk management</a></li><li>Policy</li><li>Organization</li><li>Asset management</li><li>Human resources security</li><li>Physical and environmental security</li><li>Communications and operations management</li><li><a
href="http://www.cippguide.org/2010/07/22/access-controls/">Access control</a></li><li>Software development</li><li>Incident management</li><li>Business continuity</li><li>Compliance</li></ol><p>While the ISO 27003 offers some guidance for implementation, a number of critiques regarding the ISO 27002 standard have surfaced since its publication. A few potential areas for revision include:</p><ul><li>The standard does not adequately address risk assessment. It ought to suggest more risk assessment activities.</li><li>The standard does not clearly define what an organization’s security policy should be.</li><li>The standard should assist organizations in ensuring business continuity, for instance facilitating recovery or planning to cope with incidents that may arise.</li><li>The standard should be more in depth in terms of its section on IT auditing. It may want to cover the value of auditing and improvement.</li></ul><h2>Increasing Certification</h2><p>There are a number of reasons for increasing certification to ISO 27000 series standards. Two important causes are the increase of threats to information and the increase of regulatory and statutory requirements for information protection. Over the past decade, formal ISMS are seen as necessities for organizational best practices.</p><p>According to international reports, ISO 27001 certifications have steadily been increasing by approximately one thousand organizations per year. Concurrently, global information security threats are becoming more and more visible. These threats target any organization or individual who relies on the use of electronic information. At the same time, personal data may also be at risk of natural disasters, external attack, internal corruption or theft. This has led to increasing demand for compliance from suppliers, business partners and consumers.</p><h3>Summary</h3><p>This article introduces the ISO 27001 and the ISO 27002 standards. It discusses the ISO 27000 series of standards, which regulate information systems management from a privacy perspective. The ISO 27001 aims to help organizations to improve their ISMS (information security management system) by providing a model for design and implementation. The ISO 27002 lists some guidelines for managing the life cycle of information security within an organization. It is comprised of a number of control objectives. The article finally discusses the important role of ISO standards in an organizational ISMS context.</p><h3>Foundations Exam Preparation</h3><p>In preparation for the Certification Foundation exam, a privacy professional should be comfortable with topics related to this post, including:</p><ul><li>Business risk management (I.C.a.)</li><li>Information security standards (II.A.d.)</li><li>Information security management (II.C.a.)</li></ul> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>https://www.cippguide.org/2010/07/13/iso-27000-series/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>FISMA: The Federal Information Security Management Act</title><link>https://www.cippguide.org/2010/03/04/fisma-the-federal-information-security-management-act/</link> <comments>https://www.cippguide.org/2010/03/04/fisma-the-federal-information-security-management-act/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Thu, 04 Mar 2010 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>jbrook</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[CIPP]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Compliance & Regulations]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category> <category><![CDATA[C&A]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Certification and Accreditation]]></category> <category><![CDATA[CIPP/G]]></category> <category><![CDATA[E-Government Act]]></category> <category><![CDATA[FISMA]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[OMB M-08-09]]></category> <category><![CDATA[PIA]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Privacy Impact Assessments]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Security Accreditation]]></category><guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.cippguide.org/?p=1263</guid> <description><![CDATA[The E-Government Acts of 2002 involved a large number of new regulations to implement and control the use of electronic technologies by the U.S. Government. Title III of this Act, called the Federal Information Security Management Act required all Government agencies to develop extensive information security [...]]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>The Federal Information Security Management Act</strong></p><p>The <a
title="e-Government Acts of 2002" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2010/02/22/the-e-government-act-of-2002/" target="_blank">E-Government Acts of 2002</a> involved a large number of new regulations to implement and control the use of electronic technologies by the U.S. Government. Title III of this Act, called the Federal Information Security Management Act required all Government agencies to develop extensive information security programs.</p><p><strong>What is the Importance of FISMA?</strong></p><p>The Federal Information Security and Management Act deals with Information Security, which is one of the <a
href="http://www.cippguide.org/2010/01/18/fair-information-practices-principles/">Fair Information Practice Principles</a>. Proper protection of data does not only include the acceptable use and disclosure of the data by the agency, but also the measures taken to prevent abuse of information by other parties and to protect the status and availability of the data.</p><p>FISMA incorporates the three main components of information security:</p><ul><li>Confidentiality– involves implementing the necessary restrictions and authorizations to limit access to sensitive data.</li><li>Integrity– involves ensuring information is authentic and preventing improper modification or destruction</li><li>Availability– involves the ability to readily access information and the timeliness of the information</li></ul><p><strong><a
href="http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/overview.html">What Does a FISMA Compliant Information Security Program Entail?</a></strong></p><ul><li>Periodic risk assessments must be conducted evaluating any potential harm caused by unauthorized access, use, disclosure or destruction of the data including an assessment of the magnitude of harm</li><li>Risk assessments are used to develop policies which are cost effective and reduce any security threats. These policies must also protect data at all stages of the life cycle</li><li>The efficacy of policies, procedures and security controls must be tested at least annually, with higher risk systems requiring more frequent evaluations.</li><li>An agency must implement a way to detect, report and respond to security violations</li><li>An agency must develop a continuity of operations plan to return function as quickly as possible in the event of a security incident of disruption.</li></ul><p><strong><a
href="http://csrc.nist.gov/drivers/documents/FISMA-final.pdf">What is Security Certification and Accreditation?</a></strong></p><p>Security Certification and Accreditation is the official process taken to authorize the operation of an information system by an agency of the U.S. Government. By accrediting an information system, the agency accepts full responsibility for the system and will be held accountable for any negative impacts or problems that may arise.</p><h3>The four phases of the Security Certification and Accreditation process:</h3><ol><li>Initiation Phase– ensures all parties are on the same page regarding the information system, its contents and controls before the system is evaluated. In this phase, the information security system is prepared and the security plan is analyzed and updated for review.</li><li>Security Certification Phase– evaluates security controls to make sure they are functioning correctly, that the system is operating as it should and that the information is adequately protected. In this phase, all security controls are tested documentation is created with the results.</li><li>Security Accreditation Phase– the information gathered during the previous phase is used to determine if the operation of the information system presents an acceptable security risk. In this stage, the authorizing official determines whether or not an information system may become operational, and proper documentation is filed if the system is ready to become accredited.</li><li>Continuous Monitoring Phase – ensures ongoing enforcement by requiring ongoing configuration and management control, monitoring of security controls and the filing of status reports and documents.</li></ol><p>Reaccreditation occurs periodically and after significant changes in the system or environment. The Security Certification and Accreditation process is used to evaluate an individual information system and its security. It is similar to but distinct from Privacy Impact Assessments which are used to evaluate privacy protections with regard to changes in a records system. PIA and C&amp;A evaluations for particular information systems may overlap in coverage. However, PIA are also used to evaluate privacy concerns involved with using matching programs, sharing information between agencies or when transferring data to electronic form. C&amp;A evaluations are less frequent and more extensive and evaluate individual security systems and their related policies.</p><p><strong><a
href="http://csrc.nist.gov/drivers/documents/FISMA-final.pdf">Enforcement of FISMA</a></strong></p><p>Monitoring of FISMA compliance is built into the regulation through mandatory reports due to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and several House of Representative and Senate Committees. The report must include:</p><ul><li>The information resources used by the agency</li><li>The information technologies used by the agency</li><li>The program performance</li><li>Financial management information including annual budgets, and accounting to determine cost effectiveness</li><li>Record of any significant vulnerabilities in the policies, procedures or security systems.</li></ul><p>In 2008, <a
href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2008/m08-09.pdf">OMB Memorandum 08-09</a>, added new reporting guidelines that required each agency to report:</p><ul><li>The number of each type of privacy review used by the agency during the previous fiscal year</li><li>Any new policies, guidance or advice provided by the agency official in charge of privacy in the past fiscal year</li><li>The number of written privacy complaints received in the past fiscal year</li><li>The number of privacy issues referred to another agency with the relevant jurisdiction in the past fiscal year</li></ul><p>Each agency must also create a performance plan in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget regarding the time period and resources needed including budget, staffing and training to implement or continue to implement, secure FISMA compliant information security systems.</p><p>FISMA also requires annual independent evaluations of the information security programs and procedures. The evaluation is conducted by the Inspector General of the agency, if one is appointed. It one is not appointed, the head of the agency must hire an external party to evaluate the system. A report the evaluation must be submitted to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget who then summarizes the findings in the Director’s Report to Congress.</p><p><strong>Summary:</strong></p><p>The Federal Information Security Management Act protects privacy by requiring extensive evaluations and monitoring of Government information systems to ensure data is adequately protected and operating at an acceptable level of risk.</p><p>CIPP/G Candidate Preparation</p><p>In preparation for the Certified Information Privacy Professional Government exam, a privacy professional should be comfortable with topics related to this post including:</p><ul><li>Federal Information Security Management Act (I.C.f.i-iii.)</li><li>The E-Government Act of 2002 including Privacy Impact Assessments (I.C.c.i.-ii.)</li></ul> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>https://www.cippguide.org/2010/03/04/fisma-the-federal-information-security-management-act/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>UK&#039;s secret spies nix huge covert operation after loss of USB memory stick</title><link>https://www.cippguide.org/2009/05/04/uks-secret-spies-nix-huge-covert-operation-after-loss-of-usb-memory-stick/</link> <comments>https://www.cippguide.org/2009/05/04/uks-secret-spies-nix-huge-covert-operation-after-loss-of-usb-memory-stick/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Tue, 05 May 2009 03:00:02 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>jbrook</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[CIPP]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Britain]]></category> <category><![CDATA[data loss]]></category> <category><![CDATA[DEA]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Drug Enforcement Agency]]></category> <category><![CDATA[memory stick]]></category> <category><![CDATA[MI5]]></category> <category><![CDATA[MI6]]></category> <category><![CDATA[National Security Agency]]></category> <category><![CDATA[nsa]]></category> <category><![CDATA[SE Linux]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Serious Organized Crime Agency]]></category> <category><![CDATA[SOCA]]></category> <category><![CDATA[UK]]></category> <category><![CDATA[USB memory stick]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Vista]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Windows Vista]]></category><guid
isPermaLink="false">http://www.cippguide.org/?p=454</guid> <description><![CDATA[Last week, the British Security Service and Secret Intelligence Services, better known as MI5 and MI6, showed exactly how expensive information security procedures really can be.  Details unveiled last week show MI6 scrapped a 2006 undercover drug raid operation in Columbia for fear that a lost USB stick containing covert agents and informants may have fallen into the wrong [...]]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p
class="MsoPlainText">Last week, the British <a
title="Wikipedia: Military Intelligence, Section 5 - British Security Service" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MI5" target="_blank">Security Service</a> and  <a
title="Wikipedia: Military Intelligence, Section 6 - British Secret Intelligence" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MI6" target="_blank">Secret Intelligence Services</a>, better known as MI5 and MI6, showed exactly how expensive information security procedures really can be.<span> Discussions abound of <a
title="CIPP Guide: Interview with Barbra Symonds discussing costs and number of data breaches in the US" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2008/06/12/an-interview-with-barbra-symonds-ibm-associate-partner-in-security-privacy-it-governance/" target="_blank">breach notification costs</a>, <a
title="CIPP Guide: British private investigator and construction companies fined for violating EU Data Protection Directive privacy laws" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2009/04/20/uk-builders-blacklist-demonstrates-eu-privacy-protections/" target="_blank">fines for lack of compliance</a>, or <a
title="CIPP Guide: UK Prison inmates medical records breach due to lost USB memory stick" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2009/01/13/lost-memory-stick-holds-thousands-of-uk-prison-inmates-medical-dat/" target="_blank">medical record leaks</a>, but rarely do you hear that lives were jeopardized due to a failure in information privacy.  Details unveiled last week show <a
title="UK's spy shop cancels major undercover operation after loss of unencrypted USB memory stick" href="http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2241156/mi6-scraps-operation-loss" target="_blank">MI6 scrapped a 2006 undercover drug raid operation in Columbia for fear that a lost USB stick may have fallen into the wrong hands</a>.  The memory stick contained information on dozens of agents and informants, requiring relocation of most of the affected individuals.</span></p><p
class="MsoPlainText"><span>The scheduled drug raid was a joint operation with MI5, MI6, the US Drug Enforcement Agency and organized by the <a
title="Britain's Serious Organized Crime Agency" href="http://www.soca.gov.uk/" target="_blank">Serious Organized Crime Agency</a>.  SOCA received £416 million in funding for 2006 (about $625 million), but did not release how much of that budget went for the covert operation.  <a
title="Times online describes Soca lost USB memory stick blunder and costs" href="http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6169946.ece" target="_blank">An internal source claimed to The Times &#8211; London that the aborted operation cost over £100m ($150M).</a> The agent responsible for the loss, referred to only as &#8216;T&#8217;, lost her purse somewhere between the airline terminal, the immigrations checkpoint and a bus from El Dorado airport in Bogota, Columbia.  She was heading to her new office at the British Embassy.</span></p><p
class="MsoPlainText">A Soca spokeswoman said: “Soca has introduced its own clearly defined data handling and security policies. During the year to March 2009 — the first year we have been required to report any breaches — there wasn’t a single breach of personal or sensitive data by Soca staff.”</p><p
class="MsoPlainText">The agencies took the first steps by defining data handling policies and measuring/reporting against them.  An inquiry and formal investigation into the event occurred, and remedies put in place appear to be working.  The obvious question &#8211; why was encryption not used for this sort of situation?</p><p
class="MsoPlainText">The <a
title="CIPP Guide: A group of hackers known as The Cult of the Dead Cow created a secure computer, incorporating encryption, anonymization, privacy protections and more, that will operate off a USB memory stick" href="http://www.cippguide.org/2007/10/08/want-to-avoid-wiretaps-or-questionable-search-and-seizure-try-a-secure-computer-on-usb/" target="_blank">secure computer on a USB key</a> was developed for <em>just this sort of cloak and dagger thing</em>. There are encryption routines built into every commercial operating system available today.  Dozens of security vendors sell encryption software, ranging from Full Disk Encryption, to <a
title="Sans Institute What Works in Mobile Device Encryption Conference" href="http://www.sans.org/encryption07_summit/" target="_blank">mobile device encryption</a>, to <a
title="Sans Institute lists encryption vendors" href="http://www.sans.org/resources/vendor_directory/directories.php?catid=143" target="_blank">file level and storage encryption</a>.  The US <a
title="The NSA helped secure Microsoft Windows Vista for use within classified environments" href="http://pcworld.about.com/od/longhorn/NSA-Helped-Microsoft-Make-Vist.htm" target="_blank">National Security Agency helped Microsoft with Windows Vista.</a> They designed a <a
title="NSA develops SE Linux (Security Enhanced Linux) for classified operational environments" href="http://www.nsa.gov/research/selinux/index.shtml" target="_blank">security enhanced version of Linux</a>.  The British Intelligence folks have their hands in a few secured systems as well.</p><p
class="MsoPlainText">Encryption ought to be just another wicket in the engrained security processes of an intelligence operation.  In fact, <strong>encryption ought to be a requirement for </strong><strong>every organization that processes private or mission critical information</strong>.  Security product provider Checkpoint points out the dire situtation best in a February 2009 UK survey: &#8220;&#8230;less than 50% of the UK public and private sector organisations use any form of data encryption.&#8221;</p><p
class="MsoPlainText">As a privacy professional, knowledge of information security and its ramifications to privacy are paramount to successful data protection.  Personally Identifiable Information, Private Health Records, Personal Financial Information &#8211; it&#8217;s all only as confidential as the protections surrounding it.  If the security provisions do not guarantee the data are available and the integrity&#8217;s intact, there could be more than fines or company reputation at stake.</p> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>https://www.cippguide.org/2009/05/04/uks-secret-spies-nix-huge-covert-operation-after-loss-of-usb-memory-stick/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Hundreds of millions of private credit card records stolen from PCI card processor</title><link>https://www.cippguide.org/2009/01/21/hundreds-of-millions-of-private-records-stolen-from-heartland-payment-systems/</link> <comments>https://www.cippguide.org/2009/01/21/hundreds-of-millions-of-private-records-stolen-from-heartland-payment-systems/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2009 23:19:29 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>jbrook</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Compliance & Regulations]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Hacking]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category> <category><![CDATA[CIPP]]></category> <category><![CDATA[PCI]]></category><guid
isPermaLink="false">http://blog.cippguide.org/?p=69</guid> <description><![CDATA[Credit card payment processor Heartland Payment Systems announced this week that hundreds of millions of credit card transactions were stolen last year.  This latest hack far eclipsed the 45 Million TJX Companies records lost from 2004-2007.  The stolen data includes names, credit/debit card numbers and expiration [...]]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Credit card payment processor Heartland Payment Systems announced this week that hundreds of millions of credit card transactions were stolen last year.   This latest hack far eclipsed the 45 Million TJX Companies records lost from 2004-2007.   The stolen data includes names, credit/debit card numbers and expiration dates.</p><blockquote><p>No merchant data or cardholder Social Security numbers, unencrypted personal identification numbers (PIN), addresses or telephone numbers were involved in the breach. Nor were any of Heartland&#8217;s check management systems; Canadian, payroll, campus solutions or micropayments operations; Give Something Back Network; or the recently acquired Network Services and Chockstone processing platforms.</p></blockquote><p>Heartland reportedly determined the source of the breach last week as a piece of malicious software.</p><p>Heartland Payment Systems is a member of the <a
href="https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pci_dss.shtml">Payment Card Industry&#8217;s (PCI)</a> small group of payment processors.  Any business that handles credit card data, from an end merchant through processors and the issuers themselves, are part of the PCI.  Established by a consortium of Visa, Mastercard, American Express and others, PCI is one of the largest commercial groups creating a minimum security requirement for their members.  The <a
href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PCI_DSS">Data Security Standard (DSS)</a> calls out far more specific protection requirements across it&#8217;s members than anyone outside of the Federal/military, and apply those protections for each phase of a credit card&#8217;s processing.  The final list of 12 rules includes items such as encryption, firewalls, intrusion detection, log management, and authentication/authorization.  The PCI DSS&#8217; final implementation date was over two years ago, in 2007 after a two year extension.  Each member had to pass an audit by a qualified assessor, and if a member was not in compliance, they were typically given a set amount of time to come into compliance.</p><p>One thing that does stand out is Heartland&#8217;s insistence that no Social Security numbers, unencrypted PINs, or addresses/telephone numbers were disclosed.  These are specific requirements of the DSS &#8211; it interests me whether the lack of disclosures occurred because the data were not collected, or if the data were simply encrypted.  As mentioned earlier, encryption is one of the PCI DSS requirements. <a
title="Encryption broken MD5" href="http://blog.cippguide.org/2009/01/06/decade-old-md5-flaw-will-likely-still-result-in-numerous-privacy-breaches/" target="_blank">Encryption may eventually be broken</a>, although by using the latest algorithms the information is typically expected useless by the time it is finally disclosed.  The European Union requires limiting the collection and storage of data to the minimum absolutely required.  This prevents accidental disclosure, such as the<a
title="UK prisoner's medical records lost on USB drive" href="http://blog.cippguide.org/2009/01/13/lost-memory-stick-holds-thousands-of-uk-prison-inmates-medical-dat/" target="_self"> inmates medical records loss in the UK</a>.  Within the CIPP reference guide, good privacy policy in the US should follow this sort of minimalistic attitude.</p><p>In the next iteration of the PCI provisions, aptly named the <a
href="https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pa_dss.shtml">Payment Application DSS</a>, all programs that handle credit card information must have application layer protections embedded in the system by 2010.  This should take care of many threats due to network data pilfering, but will have considerably less effect on illegitimate software running on a bank&#8217;s systems.  Hopefully it will result in lower business postage charges.</p> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>https://www.cippguide.org/2009/01/21/hundreds-of-millions-of-private-records-stolen-from-heartland-payment-systems/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>NY Police Sergeant admits making unauthorized accesses to the FBI&#039;s National Crime Information Center database</title><link>https://www.cippguide.org/2009/01/19/ny-police-sergeant-admits-making-unauthorized-accesses-to-the-fbis-national-crime-information-center-database/</link> <comments>https://www.cippguide.org/2009/01/19/ny-police-sergeant-admits-making-unauthorized-accesses-to-the-fbis-national-crime-information-center-database/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Mon, 19 Jan 2009 18:21:17 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>jbrook</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category> <category><![CDATA[access privileges]]></category> <category><![CDATA[FBI database]]></category> <category><![CDATA[National Crime Information Center]]></category> <category><![CDATA[New York Police Department]]></category> <category><![CDATA[NYPD]]></category> <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category><guid
isPermaLink="false">http://blog.cippguide.org/?p=55</guid> <description><![CDATA[Last week, a NY Police Sergeant admitted he made unauthorized accesses to the FBI's National Crime Information Center database in December [...]]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Last week, a NY Police Sergeant <a
title="New York Times: Privacy Violation by New York Police Department" href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/15/nyregion/15sergeant.html?ref=nyregion" target="_blank">admitted he made unauthorized accesses</a> to the FBI&#8217;s National Crime Information Center database in December 2007.</p><p>Sergeant Haytham Khalil <a
title="The Register:  NY cop files guilty plea" href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/01/14/ny_cop_gilty_plea/" target="_blank">obtained records for an acquaintance</a> embroiled in a custody dispute.  He was charged with a misdemeanor of &#8220;accessing a computer and as a result exceeding his authority by obtaining information belonging to a department and agency of the United States.”  Sentencing, scheduled for April 14th, could result in a $100,000 fine and one year of supervised probation.</p><p>Sergeant Khalil used another officer&#8217;s account credentials who did have appropriate access privileges.  The fellow officer left the credentials available for any of his co-workers to access the National Crime Information Center database when he wasn&#8217;t around.  Obviously, there was a violation of the researched individual&#8217;s privacy.</p><p>The biggest problem with this scenario isn&#8217;t the Sergeant,<span
id="more-55"></span>although his actions were well outside of the code of conduct by reviewing the records.  No, the biggest problem is the fellow officer&#8217;s equivalent of taping his password to the monitor, and the expectation of the co-workers within the department that the sharing of credentials should be normal operating procedure.  This type of user name/password sharing essentially amounts to a Role Based Access Control (RBAC):  every user that needs access to the system uses the same information.   Any time a system utilizes RBAC, administrators lose a great deal of accountability.  Was it officer A or B, or the guy who we promoted six months ago, or fired a year ago?  Hopefully you see the problem.</p><p>By assigning specific rights to individual users, and limiting the overlap and assignment of those rights (resulting in essentially two person controls), the system may not be gamed.  Individual users are then responsible for their actions.  There is no finger pointing, reviewing the video tapes, etc.  Policy should then dictate disciplinary action or even dismissal for sharing credentials.  One step further is some sort of biometric access control, which should be easier for the end user&#8217;s compliance.  Further still RFID badges, where you may either log in or leave the building.  These measures don&#8217;t completely eliminate a user&#8217;s logging in, then letting someone else sit at the controls, but it certainly increases the complexity.</p> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>https://www.cippguide.org/2009/01/19/ny-police-sergeant-admits-making-unauthorized-accesses-to-the-fbis-national-crime-information-center-database/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Decade old MD5 flaw will likely still result in numerous privacy breaches</title><link>https://www.cippguide.org/2009/01/06/decade-old-md5-flaw-will-likely-still-result-in-numerous-privacy-breaches/</link> <comments>https://www.cippguide.org/2009/01/06/decade-old-md5-flaw-will-likely-still-result-in-numerous-privacy-breaches/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Tue, 06 Jan 2009 23:37:39 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>jbrook</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Hacking]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Certificate Authority]]></category> <category><![CDATA[MD5]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Message Digest 5]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Rogue CA]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Secure Hash Algorithm]]></category> <category><![CDATA[SHA]]></category><guid
isPermaLink="false">http://blog.cippguide.org/?p=43</guid> <description><![CDATA[It took over a decade, but two German researchers found an application for a flaw in the MD5 hash widely used throughout the Internet for [...]]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It took over a decade, but two German researchers found an application for a flaw in the <a
title="Wikipedia - Message Digest 5" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD50" target="_blank">MD5 (Message Digest 5)</a> hash widely used throughout the Internet as an implementation of HTTPS.  The weakness was originally theorized in 1996, demonstrated in 2004 and reduced to practice June of 2007 whereby two Chinese researchers showed how a hash could be duplicated.  This was a full 11 years after the initial discovery of the non-fatal weakness and 12 years after the introduction of newer, stronger algorithms, including <a
title="Wikipedia - Secure Hash Algorithm" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA_hash_functions" target="_blank">SHA-1</a>.  </p><p>The talk, titled &#8220;<a
title="German researchers find application of MD5 flaw" href="http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/">MD5 considered harmful today: creating a rogue CA certificate&#8221;</a>, centers on creating a new PKI certificate for a well known, trusted server.  Browsers contain a default list of who constitute a trusted server and each company defines their own processes for who makes the list (<a
href="http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/">Mozilla</a>, <a
href="http://www.microsoft.com/technet/archive/security/news/rootcert.mspx">Microsoft</a>, <a
href="http://www.apple.com/certificateauthority/ca_program.html">Apple</a>, <a
href="http://www.opera.com/docs/ca/">Opera</a>).  The German researchers created an appropriately named rogue CA, consisting of a certificate attested to by one of the default trust authorities included by Mozilla in the FireFox browser.   There are plenty of details available on the hack itself.  </p><p>The question that stands out in my mind: of the 30,000 sites tested, why were there 9,000 still using an outdated cryptography?  Stands to reason that most of these trust providers have had more than adequate time to migrate to a stronger method (13 years &#8211; literally).  And at the very least, a revocation/renewal path for users after the 2004 demonstrations.  There are plenty of weak rationale: <span
id="more-43"></span>People are on slow computer connections to download so much information, The computers don&#8217;t have enough processing power to make the crypto computations, It&#8217;ll slow down the user&#8217;s experience, We need consistency with our servers.</p><p>Bogus.  There are expiration dates on certificates for a reason.  Use them.  Certificate Revocation Lists exist.  Check them.  There are key lengths and cipher versions associated with connections.  Skip the known vulnerable version.</p><p>There&#8217;s a sliver of &#8220;Why did Microsoft, Mozilla, Apple and the rest allow these certificates into their browsers?&#8221;  Politics and money perhaps.  Some of it comes down to ignorance.  If a user asks their Internet Service Provider for a secured HTTPS website, they don&#8217;t know the difference and just know they see the browser lock once everything&#8217;s done.  The pressure will come as it always does with a high profile exposure.  Do you think it will take another 10 years?</p><p>Btw, If you really want amusement, check the root chains loaded by default, especially if you&#8217;re on a little older computer.  The attached screen shot shows the buttons to press for IE7 on Vista (Internet Options-&gt;Content-&gt;Certificates-&gt;Trusted Root/Intermediate).  It&#8217;s absolutely amazing what Microsoft used to put in there &#8211; now there are only a couple that make me scratch my head&#8230;  Can you imagine how much information is at risk because of poor choices?  What if it&#8217;s your bank, or medical doctor or email provider?  </p><p><img
style="vertical-align: middle;" src="http://blog.cippguide.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/MD5_RootCA.JPG" alt="Microsoft root certificate trusts in Vista/IE" width="450" height="400" /></p> ]]></content:encoded> <wfw:commentRss>https://www.cippguide.org/2009/01/06/decade-old-md5-flaw-will-likely-still-result-in-numerous-privacy-breaches/feed/</wfw:commentRss> <slash:comments>0</slash:comments> </item> <item><title>Privacy and Messaging through Postini</title><link>https://www.cippguide.org/2008/06/06/privacy-and-messaging-through-postini/</link> <comments>https://www.cippguide.org/2008/06/06/privacy-and-messaging-through-postini/#comments</comments> <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 1970 03:59:59 +0000</pubDate> <dc:creator>jbrook</dc:creator> <category><![CDATA[Compliance & Regulations]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Information Security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Privacy]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Data Leakage Prevention]]></category> <category><![CDATA[encrypted email]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Information Privacy]]></category> <category><![CDATA[InfoSec]]></category> <category><![CDATA[mail gateway security]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Postini]]></category> <category><![CDATA[Secure Messaging]]></category><guid
isPermaLink="false">http://wordpress.cippguide.org/?p=17</guid> <description><![CDATA[<p>Postini is Google&#8217;s 2006 acquisition for secure messaging, and a direct competitor to IronPort. All of their offerings surround Software As A Service (SAAS), matching directly with Google&#8217;s overall technology strategy.  They provide several services, including web security, anti-spam/malware, mail filtering, and archival with indexing.  The Data Leakage Prevention capabilities provide privacy protections through outbound communication filters.  Additionally, there are management tools and continuity procedures appropriate for enterprise use.</p><p>Postini&#8217;s background technology stems from threat assessment and message parsing capabilities, grown through several years as a primary mail provider. There are two major patents, with a variety of [...]]]></description> <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Postini is Google&#8217;s 2006 acquisition for secure messaging, and a <a
title="Secure Messaging Gateway: An IronPort Review" href="http://blog.cippguide.org/wp-trackback.php?p=15" target="_blank">direct competitor to IronPort</a>. All of their offerings surround Software As A Service (SAAS), matching directly with Google&#8217;s overall technology strategy.  They provide several services, including web security, anti-spam/malware, mail filtering, and archival with indexing.  The Data Leakage Prevention capabilities provide privacy protections through outbound communication filters.  Additionally, there are management tools and continuity procedures appropriate for enterprise use.</p><p>Postini&#8217;s background technology stems from threat assessment and message parsing capabilities, grown through several years as a primary mail provider. There are two major patents, with a variety of claims following each one.  The first patent surrounds on-demand message scanning and routing.  The geographically distributed Postini data centers proxy all communications (corporate, wired, wireless, portal, etc) and filter the communications appropriately, removing viruses, spam etc.  The second patent  centers on threat detection and control, and methods for generating and processing a sender/ISP/country&#8217;s reputation and then acting accordingly.<span
id="more-17"></span></p><p>The technology doesn&#8217;t seem that revolutionary today, and the online documentation frequently references the existence of prior art not mentioned in the patents.  However, from a security perspective, the techniques Postini uses are sound.  Communications between Postini and corporate mail servers are TLS encrypted.    This allows additional features for Data Leakage Prevention by both companies.  The Intrusion Detection, Anti-virus, and Anti-spam filters are all independent of the networking infrastructure, and likely include best of breed solutions whenever there&#8217;s not a better trade secret/patent in-house.  Postini uses portals and web services for sending messages to non-subscriber recipients.  The portals guarantee messages are not susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack.</p><p>The Message Security and Message Delivery services offer content filtering for Data Leakage Prevention.  There are consoles and rule engines for policy definition, as well as canned Personally Identifiable Information (PII) controls for things like Social Security Numbers or credit card information.  The GUI apparently delivers enough rule granularity to at least filter attachment types and perform in message word detection.</p><p>Postini&#8217;s technology does not address malicious insider activities and could be its biggest weakness.  This becomes more of an issue when examining the Google addition of archival and search.  Site administrators may configure Postini for secure communications between corporate partner mail servers, and even make this a policy based requirement for some message delivery.  This secure communication eliminates privacy issues between the corporate email servers and the Postini data centers.  It does not, however, account for a messages time on disk or in use.  Trusted insiders at the sender&#8217;s or recipient&#8217;s locations may manipulate or view messages.  From a third party point of view, administrators at the Postini sites could possibly have enough access to circumvent many of the same protections.  On Postini&#8217;s provider end, at least within Google, record access rights are <em>strictly</em> controlled with procedure.</p><p>Google&#8217;s approach to pricing is the most attractive part of the Postini product.  It follows the principals of scale, expecting more consumers at a lower tipping point.  For $3 annually per user, Postini provides inbound email filtering (Message Filtering) for viruses, trojans, spam, etc&#8230;  At $12 annually, Postini does the same for outbound messaging and adds content and attachment conttrols as well as policy monitoring and centralized administration (Message Security).  The $25 per year includes the archival and search features Google threw into the mix (Message Discovery).</p><p><a
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